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The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly 
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to 
say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some 
curb on such technology.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to a report of an argument on a public sidewalk, a police of­
ficer approaches two people standing in the vicinity of the reported dispute. 
The officer requests that each person provide her name so the officer can run 
the names through databases to which the police department subscribes. 
After searching each name through various databases, the officer might dis­
cover that one of the individuals made several purchases of cold medicine 
containing pseudoephedrine and that the other just received a license from 
the State to procure certain hazardous chemicals. These two people might be 
in the early stages of setting up a methamphetamine ring, or they might re­
spectively be a person getting over a cold and an entrepreneur. In either 
case, merely by giving her name, each person provided the police officer 
with information that she could have reasonably believed might lead the 
officer to incriminating evidence. 
The potential for a name to be self-incriminating presents a question 
about the applicability of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 
In California v. Byers, the Supreme Court held that a person cannot refuse to 
state her name in the course of a traffic stop based on the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.2 The reason is because the statutes applicable to traffic stops are 
primarily regulatory-not criminal-and the Self-Incrimination Clause is 
inapplicable to noncriminal regulatory inquiries.3 Outside of the context of a 
traffic stop, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment prohib­
its a police officer from stopping an individual to ask for her name unless 
the police officer has "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that 
I. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J ., concurring). 
2. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (plurality opinion); id. at 458 (Harlan, 
J ., concurring in the judgment). While Byers involved a statute that required a driver to provide her 
name after an accident, successive lower courts have interpreted it as applying to traffic stops in 
general. See, e.g., Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining how 
the rationale espoused by the plurality in Byers enables a state to compel statements in the course of 
a traffic stop when the penalties for minor traffic violations are civil). 
3. Diamondstone, 148 F.3d at 121-23. 
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the individual is involved in criminal activity."4 If a police officer approaches 
an individual without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, "the individ­
ual has a right to ignore the police [officer] and go about his business."5 The 
Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable 
cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the 
evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objec­
tive justification for making the stop. The officer must be able to articulate 
more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" of 
criminal activity.6 
The Supreme Court has also indicated that although the "probable-cause 
standard is incapable of precise definition,"7 the " ' substance of all the defi­
nitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' and . . .  
the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be 
searched or seized."8 In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Supreme 
Court was presented with the question of whether in a non-traffic-stop situa­
tion an officer who has reasonable suspicion can compel a person to state 
her name.9 
The Supreme Court in Hiibel held that the Search and Seizure Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe state or federal statutes from re­
quiring an individual to provide her name to a police officer, so long as the 
police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. 10 The Supreme 
Court also held that based on the facts presented by the defendant, Larry 
Hiibel, the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause did not protect the 
defendant's decision to refuse to state his name. 1 1  The Court, however, 
4. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). For a discussion of Brown v. Texas and related 
case law, see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 183-84 (2004). 
5. Ill inois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983)). 
6. Id. at 123-24 (citation omitted) (quot ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968)). For a 
different formul ation of the definition of reasonable suspicion, see Alabama v. White: 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense 
that reasonable suspicion can be established with infor mation that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establ ish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable sus­
picion can ar ise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable 
cause. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
7. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
8. Id. (ci tation omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
9. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185-86, 188-89. 
10. Id. at 187-89. 
11. Id. at 189-91. The Court declined to consider Mr. Hiibel 's Fifth Amendment challenge 
for t wo reasons. First , Mr. Hiibel gave no indication at the time the officer requested h is name that 
h is refusal to answer was predicated on the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 191. Second, Mr. Hiibel 's "re­
fusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name 
would be used to incriminate him, or that it 'would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute' h im. " Id. at 190 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)); see also 
Arnold H. Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of Dudley Hiibel, 9111, and the Vanishing 
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explicitly reserved the question of whether some similar set of circum­
stances may j ustify an individual's invocation of the Fifth Amendment's 
Self-Incrimination Clause to refuse to state a name.1 2 
The Supreme Court's decision in Hiibel and the Court's Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence have left unresolved whether a person can invoke 
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to refuse to state a name 
in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation. 13 This Note uses the term non­
traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation to reference a situation in which a police 
officer has reasonable suspicion, but does not have probable cause for either 
a search or an arrest. Post-arrest, a person cannot refuse to state her name 
based on the Self-Incrimination Clause because the information is being 
sought for record-keeping purposes and is reasonably related to the govern­
ment's administrative concerns. 14 The Supreme Court's rationale in these 
cases does not extend to non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situations because the 
purpose for seeking a name in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation is not 
regulatory or administrative, but to further a criminal investigation. 15 
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause16 only applies to 
communications that are testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. 17 A 
statement that fails to meet any one of the requirements is not protected un­
der the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 18 The Court has 
defined the first requirement, that the statement be testimonial, as communi­
cations by the accused that "explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion 
or disclose information." 19 This definition encompasses most verbal state-
Fourth Amendment, 109 PENN ST. L. REv .  929, 930-36 (2005) (reprinting the t ranscript of the ex­
change between M r. Hiibel and the sheriff's deputy). 
12 .  Hiibel, 542 U.S. a t  1 9 1 .  
13. See, e.g., United States v. Doe , 128 F. App'x 179, 180-8 1 (2d Cir. 2005) (unpublished) 
(noting that the "Fifth Amendment juri sprudence regarding the right to withhold one's name is far 
from clear when applied to Doe 's" refusal to provide his name during sentencing); State v. Brown, 
2004-0hio-4058, 'll'l! 23-27 (Ct. App.) (anal yzing whether the Self-Incrimination Clause justifies 
refusing to provide a name to a police officer if  the name will reveal the existence of an arrest war­
rant); Schreyer v. State, No. 05-03-01 127-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 5921, at *40-41, 2005 WL 
1793193, at * 1 3  (Tex. App. July 29, 2005) (same). 
14. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601--02 (1990). 
15 .  Bait. City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v .  Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561 (1 990) ("The State's 
regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a 
criminal prosecution . . . .  "); see also infra Sections LB, II.A. 
16. "No person . . .  shall be compel led in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
. . . .  " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
17. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189; Uni ted States v. Hubbell , 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000); Doe v. 
United States (Doe If), 487 U.S. 201, 209 n.8 (1988); United States v. Doe (Doe[), 465 U.S. 605, 
610 n.8 (1984). 
1 8. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) ("[T]he Court has never on any 
ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper 
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial 
sel f-incrimination of some sort."). 
19. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 10. 
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ments.20 The second requirement, that the statement be incriminating, re­
quires that the statement either support a conviction under a criminal statute 
or provide a link in the chain of evidence for prosecution under a criminal 
statute.2 1  The definition of incriminating extends the privilege to statements 
that do not contain inculpatory information but that may lead to incriminat­
ing information. 22 The third requirement, that the statement be compelled, 
has been defined by the Supreme Court as circumstances that "deny the in­
dividual a 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' "23 A 
person's refusal to answer a question where the answer would be testimo­
nial, incriminating, and compelled, enjoys the protection of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
In the past fifteen years, the implications of a person providing her name 
to a police officer24 have been altered by the development of previously in­
feasible databases,25 which have changed the information that a name 
provides.26 New, complex databases,  such as the Factual Analysis Criminal 
2 0. Id. at 2 1 3- 14 ("Th ere are very fe w  i nstanc es i n  which a verbal statement, either oral or 
written, will not c onvey i nformati on or assert fac ts. Th e vast majority of verbal statements thus will 
be testimoni al and, to that extent at least, wi ll fall wi th in the pri vi le ge."). In th e c ontext of th e Self­
Inc riminati on Clause, a statement does not need to be made i n  a c ourt proc eeding, polic e  station, or 
oth er simi lar f orum in order to be c onsi dered testi moni al .  See id; Lefk owi tz v. T urley, 414  U.S. 70, 
77 ( 1 973) ("T he [F ifth ] Amendment not only protec ts th e i ndivi dual against being involuntarily 
c alled as a witness agai nst hi mself in a c rimi nal prosec ution but also pri vileges h im not to answer 
offici al questions put to him i n  any oth er proc eeding, c ivil or c riminal, formal or informal, where th e 
answers mi gh t inc ri minate h im i n  future c rimi nal proc eedings."); K asti gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441 ,  444 ( 1 972 ) (" [Th e  pri vi lege agai nst self-i nc ri mination] c an be asserted i n  any proc eeding, ci vil 
or c riminal, admi ni strative or judic ial, investi gatory or adjudic atory . . . .  "). 
2 1 . Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38; Maness v. Meyers, 4 1 9  U.S. 449, 46 1 ( 1 975) ("T he protec ti on 
does not merely enc ompass evi denc e which may lead to c rimi nal c onvic ti on, but i nc ludes informa­
ti on which would furni sh a li nk in th e chai n  of evi denc e th at c ould lead to prosec uti on, as well as 
evi denc e which an indivi dual reasonably believes c ould be used against hi m i n  a c rimi nal prosec u­
ti on."); Hoff man v. United States, 34 1 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1 95 1). 
22 . Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38 (" Compelled testimony that c ommunic ates i nf ormation th at may 
' lead to inc ri minati ng evidenc e' i s  privileged even i f  the i nformation itself i s  not inc ulpatory. It is th e 
F ifth Amendment's protec tion agai nst th e prosec utor' s  use of i nc ri minating information derived 
di rec tly or i ndi rec tly from th e c ompelled testi mony of th e respondent that i s  of pri mary relevanc e in 
thi s c ase." (c iting Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 08 n.6 )); Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 . 
2 3. Mi nnesota v. Murphy, 46 5 U.S. 42 0, 42 9 ( 1 984) (quoti ng Gamer v. United States, 42 4 
U.S. 6 48, 6 57 ( 1976 )). F or th e Supreme Court' s  fi rst artic ulation of th is  defi nition of c ompelled, see 
Lisenba v. California, 3 1 4  U.S. 2 1 9, 2 4 1  ( 1941) .  
2 4. Thi s Note tr eats th e terms "auth orities," " polic e offic er," and " government agent" as 
synonymous bec ause th e Fi fth Amendment' s Self-I nc ri mination Clause appli es against th e states 
and agai nst the federal government. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ,  6 ( 196 4). 
2 5. See generally Mi ng- Syan Chen et al., Data Mining: An Overview from a Database Per­
spective, 8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 866 ( 1 996 ) (di sc ussing 
th e tech nic al implic ati ons of i nc reases in th e c apabi liti es of tech nologi es th at c ollec t  and store i n­
f ormati on); W illi K lo sgen & Jan M. Z ytkow, Knowledge Discovery in Databases: The Purpose, 
Necessity, and Challenges, in HANDBOOK OF DATA MINING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 1 (W illi 
K lo sgen & Jan M. Z ytkow eds., 2 002 ) (disc ussing th e development of tech ni ques for extrac ti ng 
i nformati on from large data sets). 
26 . Chris Jay Hoofn agle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Com­
mercial Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT' L L. & COM . 
REG. 595, 596 ,  6 00 (2 004) (di sc ussing th e abi li ty of law enforc ement to obtai n a broad array of 
personal data from vari ous databases). 
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Threat Solution (FACTS),27 the National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC),28 the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technol­
ogy Program (US-VISIT),29 and the Transportation Workers Identification 
Credential (TWIC)30 have the capacity to organize information beyond that 
available through other resources.31 They provide police with the ability to 
search information ranging from property ownership to federal government 
terrorist watch lists,32 and from date of birth to the authority of an individual 
to access various transportation facilities.33 As will be discussed in this Note, 
the development of detailed government and commercial databases means 
that a name now provides access to detailed information about a person's 
past criminal or alleged criminal activities. 
This Note argues that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment applies to a person who has been requested to provide her 
27. Th e FACT S i s  th e p roduc t of th e now termi nated Multi- State Anti -Terrori sm Informati on 
(MATR IX) Pi lot Proj ec t. See Press R elease, F la. Dep 't of L aw Enf orc ement, MATR IX Pi lot 
Proj ec t Conc ludes (Ap r. 15 ,  200 5), h ttp :/ /www.fdle.state.f l.us/p ress_ releases/200504 15_ matri x_ 
p roj ec t.h tml. 
28. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000) (auth ori zi ng th e Attorney General to "acqui re, c ollec t, c lassi fy, 
and p reserve i dentificati on, c ri mi nal i denti fic ati on, c ri me, and oth er rec ords . . . .  "); 28 C.F.R . 
§ 0.85(f) (2004) (auth ori zi ng th e Di rec tor of th e F ederal Bureau of Investi gati ons to c reate th e Na­
ti onal Cri mi nal Info rmati on Center); Notic e of Modified Systems of R ec ords, 64 F ed. R eg. 52,343 
(Sep t. 28, 1 999) (p ursuant to Pri vac y Ac t of 1 974) [h erei nafter DOJ Notic e]. 
29. Notic e of R evi sed Pri vac y Imp ac t Assessment and Pri vac y Polic y (US-VISIT Program), 
6 9  F ed. R eg. 57,036 (Sep t. 23, 2004) [h erei nafter Notic e of R evi sed US- VISIT PIA]; Notic e of 
Pri vac y Imp ac t Assessment and Pri vac y Polic y (US- VISIT Program), 6 9  F ed. R eg. 2,6 08 (Jan. 16 , 
2004) [h erei nafter Notice of US- VISIT PIA]. 
30. Notic e to establi sh new and altered systems of rec ords; request fo r  c omments, 6 8  F ed. 
R eg. 49,496 , at 49,507-0 8 (Aug. 1 8, 2003) (p ursuant to Pri vac y Ac t of 1 974) [h erei nafter T SA 
Notic e] . 
3 1 .  See generally Ch en et al., supra note 25; K lo sgen & Z ytkow, supra note 25; MARK 
DOUGHERTY ET AL., DEVELOPING GIS-ENABLED CRIME ANALYSIS APPLICATIONS USING VALUE­
ADDED WAREHOUSE DATA FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (March 2004), h ttp :// www.ojp .usdoj.gov/nij/ 
map s/boston2004/p ap ers/Dough erty.p df (di sc ussi ng th e role of databases i n  modern law enfo rc e­
ment and th e p otenti al gai ns from i ntegrati ng vari ous law enfo rc ement i nfo rmati on sourc es). 
32. Th e abi li ty to c onduc t a search wi th a p erson's name but wi th out oth er i nfo rmati on, such 
as date of bi rth , i s  unc lear. In Hiibel, th e State of Nevada and th e amic us bri ef of th e Nati onal Asso­
ci ati on of Polic e Organi zati ons argued th at a name was suffici ent to p ermi t a p olic e officer to obtai n 
i nfo rmati on about a susp ec t. Bri ef for R esp ondent at 1 7- 1 8, Hii bel v. Si xth Judicial Di st. Court, 542 
U.S. 177  (200 4) (No. 03-5554), 200 4 WL 99348; Bri ef for th e Nat'! Ass'n of Polic e Orgs. as Amici 
Curi ae Supp orti ng R esp ondents at 5-6 ,  Hii bel v. Si xth Judici al Di st. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77 (2004) 
(No. 03- 5554), 200 4 WL 1 2 1 586 [h erei nafter NAPO Amicus Brief]. At least wi th regard to c ri mi nal 
hi story i nfo rmati on, a name alone app ears to be i nsuffici ent to obtai n i nfo rmati on about an i ndi vi d­
ual. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S . DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL 
HISTORY R ECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 37 (2001 ), available at 
h ttp :// www.ojp .usdoj.gov/bjs/p ub/pdf/umch riO l .p df [h erei nafter Criminal History Record Informa­
tion]. But see Uni ted States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F. 3d 7 14, 7 16 (7th Ci r. 1 994) (di sc ussi ng a 
p olic e  offic er obtai ni ng i nfo rmati on about two i ndi vi duals' p otenti al i nvolvement i n  narc otic s traf­
fic ki ng based on names obtai ned fr om a h otel re gi stry), vacated, 5 1 7  U.S. 6 90 ( 1 996 ); see also infra 
note 1 32 (p rovi di ng th e f ull app ellate hi story of Ornelas-Ledesma). These li mi tati ons may not be 
app lic able to some of th e oth er databases, such as th e F ACT S  and US-VISIT .  Cf WILLIAM J. 
KROUSE, THE MU LTI-S TATE ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATR IX) Pit.OT PROJECT 
4 (200 4), available at h ttp:/ /www.fas.org/i rp /cr s/RL 32536 .pdf (di sc ussi ng th e abi li ty of law en­
fo rc ement to use FACT S  to c omp lete search es based on i nc omp lete i nformati on). 
33. Th e Appendi x, infra, outli nes th e detai ls of th e i nfo rmation p rovi ded in each database. 
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name in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation because of the potential for 
law enforcement databases to reveal incriminating information. Part I con­
tends that a person's answer to a question requesting her name for a 
database search is a compelled, testimonial, self-incriminating statement 
that fulfills the three requirements for the invocation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Part II evaluates the practical application of people de­
clining to state their names based on the privilege against self-incrimination. 
I. APPL YI NG T HE T HREE RE QU IRE ME NT S  F OR T HE I N VOC AT ION OF 
T HE SELF-I NCR IMINAT ION CL AUSE T O  T HE D ISC LOSURE OF A 
N AME U SE D F OR A D AT ABASE SE ARC H 
As aforementioned, a statement must be testimonial, incriminating, and 
compelled to trigger the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 
There are circumstances in which stating one's name to a government agent 
can meet all three of these requirements. Section I.A shows that stating 
one's name fulfills the testimonial requirement because a person stating her 
name is making a factual assertion about her identity. Section l.B establishes 
that the incriminating aspect of a person's name stems from the ability of a 
police officer to use a person's name to search various databases and then to 
combine the immediate circumstances and the database information in fur­
therance of a criminal investigation. Section l.C explains how imposing 
criminal or other sanctions for refusing to state one's name is sufficient to 
make stating one's name a compelled statement. 
A .  Stating One's Name Is Testimonial 
The word "witness" in the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause 
limits the privilege against self-incrimination to testimonial statements.34 
The limitation to testimonial statements has not limited the privilege to 
statements made in court. 35 Determining whether a statement is testimonial 
for the purpose of the Self-Incrimination Clause depends on whether the 
content of the statement "communicates any factual assertions" or "conveys 
any information to the Govemment."36 To classify stating one's name as 
3 4. " No person . . .  sh all be c ompelled i n  any c riminal c ase to be a wi tness agai nst hi mself 
. . .  " U.S. CONST . amend. V; Uni ted States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 63 8- 4 1 ,  643-4 4 (2 004) (plural­
i ty opi nion); United States v. Hubbell, 53 0 U.S. 2 7, 34 (2 000); Doe v. United States (Doe fl ), 487 
U.S. 2 0 1 ,  2 12 ( 1 988). 
3 5. Uni ted States v. Balsys, 52 4 U.S. 666 , 6 72 ( 1 998) (" [Th e Self- Inc ri minati on Clause] 'c an 
be assert ed i n  any proc eedi ng, c ivil or c ri mi nal, admi nistrati ve or judici al, i nvesti gatory or adjudic a­
tory,' in which th e witness reasonably believes th at th e informati on sough t, or di sc overable as a 
result of hi s testimony, c ould be used i n  a subsequent state or federal c ri minal proc eedi ng." (quoti ng 
K astigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 44 1 ,  444-45 ( 1972 ))). Th e extensi on of th e applic ati on of th e 
Self- Inc ri mination Clause to proc eedings oth er th an c rimi nal c ourt proc eedi ngs h as been li mi ted 
th rough th e i nc ri mi nation require ment for invoki ng th e Self- Inc rimination C lause. See infra notes 
1 03- 1 13 and acc ompanying text. 
36 . Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 14- 1 5  ("Th e difficult question wh eth er a c ompelled c ommunic ati on 
is testimonial for purposes of applyi ng th e F ifth Amendment often depends on th e fac ts and 
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testimonial, it must, "explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or 
disclose information."37 Stating one's name makes such a conveyance.38 The 
majority in Hiibel declined to resolve Mr. Hiibel's Fifth Amendment chal­
lenge on the grounds that a name is not testimonial and instead noted that 
stating a name may be testimonial because "[s]tating one's name may qual­
ify as an assertion of fact relating to identity."39 In Crawford v. Washington, 
the Supreme Court stated that " [w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, 
it applies at a minimum to . . . police interrogations."40 Questioning by a po­
lice officer in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation is a form of police 
interrogation, so responses to questions in such a context would be testimo­
nial for Sixth Amendment purposes.41 The Supreme Court's analysis in 
Crawford supports classifying a name as testimonial and the classification is 
also supported by the Supreme Court's prior Self-Incrimination Clause ju­
risprudence. Section I.A. I explains why stating one's name is not within the 
class of acts that the Supreme Court has classified as nontestimonial. Sec­
tion I.A.2 explains that a name fulfills the testimonial requirement because 
the Self-Incrimination Clause protects any statements wherein the substance 
of the statement involves the disclosure of a person's knowledge. 
1. Stating One's Name Is Not within the Class of Compelled Acts 
the Court Has Classified as Nontestimonial 
Over the last century, the Supreme Court found the government's com­
pelling of certain acts to be consistent with the privilege against self­
incrimination. By classifying these acts as nontestimonial, the Court created 
a group of government-compelled self-incriminating behaviors not prohib­
ited by the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause.42 Although some 
ci rc umstanc es of th e p artic ular c ase. Thi s c ase i s  no exc ep ti on. We tum, th en, to c onsi der wh eth er 
Doe's exec uti on of th e c onsent di rec ti ve at i ssue here would h ave testi moni al si gni fic anc e. W e  agree 
wi th th e Court of App eals th at i t  would not, bec ause nei th er th e form, nor i ts executi on, c ommuni ­
c ates any fac tual asserti ons, i mp lici t or exp licit, or c onveys any i nformati on to th e Government." 
(ci tati on omi tted)). 
37. Id. at 2 10. 
38. See id. at 2 1 3- 14. 
39. Hii bel v. Six th J udici al Di st. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77, 1 89 (200 4). F or an examp le of a c ourt 
post-Hiibel findi ng an i ndi vi dual's statement of hi s name in resp onse to p olic e  questi oni ng to be 
testi moni al, see State v. Brown, 2 004-0hi o- 4058, 'll'II 2 5-2 7 (Ct. App .). 
40. Crawford v. W ashi ngton, 541 U.S. 36 , 68 (2 004). 
4 1 .  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 1 95 (Stevens, J ., di ssenti ng); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 6 8. 
42 . Permi tti ng th e government to c ompel th ese ac ts h as been sep arate from th e rati onale for 
not extendi ng th e p ri vi lege agai nst self-i nc ri mi nati on to documents wri tten by th e i ndi vi dual. See 
Fi sh er v. Uni ted States, 42 5 U.S. 391 ,  4 1 0  n. 1 1  ( 1 976 ). Th e p ri vi lege agai nst self-i nc ri mi nati on does 
not extend to th e c omp elled p roduc ti on of doc uments bec ause th e government di d not c ompel th e 
i ndi vi dual to make th e doc uments. See March etti v. Uni ted States, 390 U.S. 39, 53- 54 ( 1 96 8) (h old­
i ng th e Self-I nc ri mi nati on Clause app lic able to a doc ument an i ndi vi dual i s  c omp elled to c omp lete). 
But see Aaron M. Clemens, The Pending Reinvigoration of Boyd: Personal Papers are Protected by 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 N. ILL U. L. RE v. 75 (2004 )  (suggesti ng th at Hubbell i s  
th e h arbi nger of a return to th e Self- I nc ri mi nati on Clause's p rotec ti on of i ndi vi duals fr om th e c om­
p elled pro duc ti on of personal p ap ers). 
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might argue that one's name is like a physical identifier and therefore is 
nontestimonial, stating one's name to the police is outside of this classifica­
tion because the evidentiary value of a person stating her name derives from 
the substance of her communication. 
Determining whether an act is testimonial depends upon whether the 
evidentiary value of the statement derives from the substance of the com­
munication or act. In United States v. Holt, the Supreme Court first 
distinguished statements from mere acts.43 In Holt, the defendant was re­
quired to put on a shirt in order for the jury to assess the fit of the shirt to the 
defendant.44 The Court classified the wearing of a shirt as an act that enabled 
the j ury to compare the defendant's physical attributes to those of the perpe­
trator.45 The evidentiary value derived not from the defendant but from the 
inferences and analyses of the jurors.46 The Court applied the same principle 
when it held that the evidentiary value of a compelled blood sample derived 
from the chemical analysis of the blood.47 The Court expanded the scope of 
the principle of the evidentiary value not deriving from the defendant by 
holding in Gilbert v. California that compelled handwriting exemplars rep­
resent real or physical evidence, not testimonial evidence.48 The Court's 
analysis in Gilbert clarified the distinction between testimonial and nontes­
timonial by indicating that the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
only applies when the evidentiary value derives from the substance of the 
49 person's statement. 
The Supreme Court has also stressed the relevance of the communicative 
aspect of a testimonial statement. In United States v. Dionisio, the government 
was permitted to compel a person to make a recording of his voice because 
the recording's evidentiary value arose from the physical attributes of the 
person's voice, not the content of his recorded statements.5° Finally, in United 
States v. Wade, the Court held that the government's compelling a defendant 
to participate in a line-up did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.5 1  The 
Court in Wade went on to reiterate the proposition from Holt that the privilege 
against self-incrimination permits the compelled introduction of a person's 
43. Uni ted States v. Holt, 2 18 U.S. 245, 2 52 -53 ( 1 910). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46 . Id. at 2 53. 
47. Sch merber v. Califo rni a, 384 U.S. 757, 76 5 ( 1 966 ). 
48. Gilbert v. Califo rnia, 388 U.S. 26 3, 266-6 7 ( 1 96 7). 
49. Id. at 266 -6 7  (" One's voic e and h andwri ting are, of c ourse, means of c ommunic ati on. It 
by no means follows, h owever, th at every c ompulsi on of an acc used to use hi s voic e or wri te c om­
pels a c ommunic ati on withi n th e c over of th e pri vilege. A mere h andwri ting exemplar, in c ontrast to 
th e c ontent of wh at is wri tten, li ke th e voic e  or body i tself, i s  an identi fying ph ysic al ch arac teri stic 
outsi de i ts protec tion."). 
50. United States v. Dioni sio, 410  U.S. 1 ,  7 ( 1973). In Dionisio, th e voic e  exemplars were 
part of a gambli ng i nvesti gati on. Th e evi denc e i n  th e c ase i nc luded rec ordi ngs from wire taps and 
about twenty people were subpoenaed to read transc ripts of th e wi retapped c onversati ons. Th e voic e 
exemplars rec orded fr om th e reading of th e transc ri pts were th en c ompared to th e wiretaps. Id. at 3. 
5 1 .  United States v. W ade, 388 U.S. 2 1 8, 22 1 -22 ( 1 96 7). 
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physical characteristics.52 The Court found these acts to be nontestimonial 
because the evidentiary aspect of each of the acts in these cases stemmed 
from a noncommunicative element in the act. 
Stating one's name is communicative and therefore cannot be compelled 
without being testimonial. The evidentiary value of a person stating her 
name is that the person making the statement is asserting that the name she 
speaks is her name. Unlike the information that a jury infers when a defen­
dant is compelled to try on a glove,53 the information gleaned when a person 
is compelled to state her name is based on the person's knowledge, and the 
value of her statement to the government derives from the substance of the 
statement. For example, a defendant could be compelled to try on a particu­
lar shirt in front of the jury but could not be compelled to testify as to his 
shirt size because the latter would permit the State to compel a statement for 
the purpose of using the substance of the statement. The Supreme Court's 
Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence supports classifying the statement 
of a name as testimonial because the statement is an assertion based on the 
speaker's knowledge and the government's interest in the statement derives 
from the substance of the statement. 
2. Stating One's Name Requires a Sufficient Disclosure from 
a Person's Mind to Be Testimonial 
The Supreme Court has excluded from the protection of the Self­
lncrimination Clause acts that are "not sufficiently testimonial."54 So, some­
one might argue that providing one's name to a police officer is 
nontestimonial because a name is "not sufficiently testimonial." A "not suf­
ficiently testimonial" statement is testimonial because it requires the person 
to acknowledge a fact, but that acknowledgement is not sufficient for the 
Self-Incrimination Clause because it does not reveal the contents of the per­
son's mind.55 For instance, in Doe II, the Court classified a consent directive 
that allowed the government to access a bank account as nontestimonial.56 
The consent directive at issue in Doe II was a document to be signed by the 
defendant that would authorize foreign banks to produce records related to 
accounts the defendant allegedly had.57 A consent directive arguably appears 
52. Id. 
53. E.g. , last Week in O.J. History; Week 68 (The Final Week): All O.J. All the Ttme, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1 995, at A34 (discussing comments by jurors about the failure of a glove that had the 
blood of the victim, Nicole Brown Simpson, to fit the defendant, O.J. Simpson); Bob Pool & Amy 
Pyle, Case Was Weak, Race Not Factor, Two Jurors Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1 995, at Al (same). 
54. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201 ,  2 1 6- 1 7, 2 1 7  n. 1 5  ( 1988) (discussing 
the inapplicability of the Self-Incrimination Clause to statements or acts that are "not sufficiently 
testimonial"). 
55. Id. at 2 1 6  & n . 1 4  (discussing statements or acts that are "not sufficiently testimonial " as 
being those that do not reveal the contents of an individual's mind). 
56. Id. at 2 14- 1 9. 
57. Id. at 202-03, 204 n .2. The text of the directive was: 
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to be more testimonial than stating one's name because a consent directive 
typically involves acknowledging more information-ownership or control 
of specific accounts at a particular bank. Reviewing the Court's analysis in 
Doe II, however, shows that stating one's name does not fall into the narrow 
"not sufficiently testimonial" exception for two reasons. 
First, the consent directive was nontestimonial because it only required 
the person signing the directive to attest to hypothetical facts;58 a person stat­
ing her name is not attesting to a hypothetical fact. More specifically, the 
consent directive only referenced hypothetical accounts without speaking as 
to the authenticity of any documents.59 The Court also noted that the consent 
directive was not an admission of the "control or existence" of any bank 
accounts.60 Furthermore, the phrasing of the consent directive in Doe II did 
not even acknowledge that the person had consented to the release of the 
bank records.61 In order for a person responding to a request for her name to 
avoid conveying information from her mind in the same manner as the hy­
pothetical phrasing of the consent directive in Doe II, the person would need 
to say something like: "There could hypothetically be a person known as 
Jane Doe. I neither confirm nor deny being Jane Doe. I am not admitting 
any knowledge as to the existence or nonexistence of Jane Doe. I am also 
not admitting knowledge of any information associated with such a person." 
This statement starkly contrasts with what a police officer would likely con­
sider an acceptable response to a request for a person's name. The extent of 
the contrast demonstrates that the ordinary statement of a name lacks the 
hypothetical nature of the Doe II consent directive that provided the basis 
for classifying the directive as nontestimonial. 
I, __ , of the State of Texas in the United States of America, do hereby direct any bank or 
trust company at which I may have a bank account of any kind or at which a corporation has a 
bank account of any kind upon which I am authorized to draw, and its officers, employees and 
agents, to disclose all information and deliver copies of all documents of every nature in your 
possession or control which relate to said bank account to Grand Jury 84-2 ... or to any attor­
ney of the District of Texas, or to any attorney of the United States Department of Justice 
assisting said Grand Jury, and to give evidence relevant thereto, in the investigation conducted 
by Grand Jury 84-2 ... and this shall be irrevocable authority for so doing. This direction has 
been executed pursuant to that certain order of the United States District Court for the South­
ern District of Texas issued in connection with the aforesaid investigation, dated __ . This 
direction is intended to apply to the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law of the 
Cayman Islands, and to any implied contract of confidentiality between Bermuda banks and 
their customers which may be imposed by Bermuda common law, and shall be construed as 
consent with respect thereto as the same shall apply to any of the bank accounts for which I 
may be a relevant principal. 
Id. at 204 n .2. 
58. Id. at 215 ( "The consen t  directive itself is not ' testimonial.' It is carefully drafted not to 
make reference to a specific account, but only to speak in the hypothetical. Thus, the form does not 
acknowledge that an account in a foreign financial institution is in existence or that it is controlled 
by petitioner. Nor does the form indicate whether documents or any other information relating to 
petitioner are present at the foreign bank, assuming that such an account does exist."). 
59. Id . at 2 15- 17 .  
60. Id . at 218  (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1 166, 1 17 1  ( 2d Cir. 1 987); United 
States v. Ghidoni, 732 F .2d 8 1 4, 8 1 8  & n .9 (I I th Cir. 1 984)) . 
6 1 .  Id. at 2 15- 1 6, 2 1 6  n . 14. 
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Second, the Court in Doe II stated that the information given was non­
testimonial because it merely pointed to a third party and that third party 
provided the incriminating factual assertion. The Court in Doe II rejected 
the argument that signing the consent directive was testimonial because the 
person was acknowledging that the signing had been performed by him.62 
The Court held that the implicit admission by the individual that he had per­
formed the compelled act was not "sufficiently testimonial"63 because the 
bank-not the defendant-would make the relevant factual assertion about 
the ownership of the accounts.64 When a person states her name, she is the 
party making the relevant factual assertion-her identity. Therefore, the 
situation in which a person must state her name is unlike the situation in 
Doe II in which the relevant factual assertion would be made by a 
h. d 65 t lf party. 
The Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Hubbell of what is 
"sufficiently testimonial" elucidates why stating one's name is "sufficiently 
testimonial."66 The purpose of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination 
Clause is to prevent a person from being compelled to disclose incriminat­
ing information based on her knowledge67 or the contents of her mind.68 
Courts have repeatedly explained the distinction between what is protected 
and what is not protected through an analogy to the difference between the 
key to a strongbox and the combination to a wall safe.69 The privilege 
against self-incrimination does not bar discovery of incriminating informa­
tion contained in a strongbox or wall safe, rather the privilege against self­
incrimination limits the means that the police can use to obtain access to the 
incriminating information. 70 If the information that the police seek is con-
62. ld. at 2 1 7 n . 1 5 .  
63. Id. ("Petitioner apparently maintains that the per for mance of every compelled act carries 
with it an implied assertion that the act has been performed by the person who was compelled, and 
therefore the performance of the act is subject to the privilege. In Wade, Gilbert, and Dionisio, the 
Court implicitly rejected this argument. It could be said in those cases that the suspect, by providing 
his handwriting or voice exemplar, implicitly 'acknowledged' that the writing or voice sample was 
his. But as the holdings made clear, this kind of simple acknowledgment-that the suspect in fact 
performed the compelled act-is not 'sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege.' " (quot­
ing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 ,  4 1 1  ( 1 976))). 
64. Id. at 2 1 8. 
65. See id. 
66. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43-44 (2000). 
67. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 1 ;  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 2 1 8, 222-23 (1967). 
68. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 1 18, 128 ( 1 957). 
69. E.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 0  n.9; see also United States v. 
Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753-54 (5th Cir. 200 1 )  (holding evidence that had been obtained as a result of 
the defendant revealing to government agents the combinations to cases containing incriminating 
evidence inadmissible at trial based on the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause). 
70. See Doe II, 487 U.S. at 206--07; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 ( 1973) 
(" [T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to 
information that may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: 'A party is pr ivileged from 
producing the evidence but not from its production .' " (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 
457, 458 ( 1 9 1 3))). 
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tained in a wall safe that requires a combination, the police cannot compel a 
person to reveal the combination to the wall safe.7 1 The police cannot com­
pel the disclosure of the wall safe's combination because this represents the 
contents of a person's mind, the area protected by the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.72 In contrast, if the information is contained in a strongbox, the Self­
Incrimination Clause would not bar the police from compelling the produc­
tion of the key. 73 A person who is compelled to produce the key is not being 
required to speak of her own guilt; rather she is being compelled to produce 
a tangible object.74 
The analogy shows that the privilege against self-incrimination does not 
prevent the police from obtaining incriminating information. 75 Rather, the 
privilege protects a person from being compelled to provide the government 
with the incriminating information or links to the incriminating information 
from her own mind.76 For example, in Hubbell the Supreme Court applied 
the strongbox and wall safe analogies to the compelled production of docu­
ments. 77 In October of 1996, Webster Hubbell was served with a subpoena 
duces tecum from the Independent Counsel for the production of docu­
ments. 78 Mr. Hubbell initially invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to 
state whether the documents sought by the subpoena were within his control 
or possession79 but later produced 13,120 pages of documents after being 
granted immunity. 80 In April of 1998, the Independent Counsel charged Mr. 
7 1 .  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 0  n.9; Green, 272 F.3d at 753-54. 
72. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 0  n.9; Green, 272 F.3d at 753. 
73. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 0  n.9. 
74. See id. at 2 10-1 1 (reviewing pr ior cases involving compelled nontestimonial acts). 
75. Id. at 206--07; Couch, 409 U.S. at 328; see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 ,  
459--62 ( 1972). In Kastigar, the Court discussed a requirement that arises when the government 
seeks to use evidence against the defendant that it obtained from the defendant under a grant of 
immunity. In such a circumstance, the government has the burden of showing that it had a " legiti­
mate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 406 U.S. at 460. The government is 
free to use other means of investigation, whether those means be other witnesses or forensic work, 
to discover the same information that the individual declined to state based on the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Id. at 46 1 .  
76. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 ( 1 990); Doe II, 487 U.S. at 2 1 3  ("[T]he privi­
lege is asserted to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of 
facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the Govern­
ment."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 2 1 8, 222-23 ( 1967). 
77. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 30, 43 (2000). 
78. Id. at 3 1 .  Mr. Hubbell was being investigated by the Independent Counsel as part of the 
investigation of the Whitewater D evelopment Corporation. Id. at 30. In December of 1 994, Mr. 
Hubbell pied guilty to charges of mail fraud and tax evasion that had been brought by the Independ­
ent Counsel. Id. 
79. Id. at 3 1 .  The Self-Incrimination Clause does not permit a person to refuse to produce 
documents; however, "the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena may have a com­
pelled testimonial aspect." Id. at 36. The act of producing documents is implicitly a compelled 
testimonial statement because by "producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness 
would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Doe (Doe /), 465 U.S. 605, 6 1 3  & n . 1 1  ( 1984)). 
80. Id. at 3 1 .  The immunity was granted pursuant to 1 8  U.S.C. § 6003(a), which provides: 
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Hubbell with tax-related crimes, and the documents obtained through the 
1996 subpoena provided part of the evidence for the charges.81 The govern­
ment disclaimed the need to introduce any of the documents obtained under 
the subpoena to prove the charges against Mr. Hubbell.82 The Supreme 
Court, however, found that the government had made "derivative use" of the 
documents in preparing its case and in obtaining the indictment against 
Mr. Hubbell.83 
The Supreme Court found that producing documents in response to 
some of the broad questions in the subpoena was "the functional equivalent 
of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a 
series of oral questions at a discovery deposition."84 In consideration of these 
facts, the Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that Mr. 
Hubbell's production of the documents was "a simple physical act-the act 
of producing the documents."85 The Supreme Court held that in responding 
to the subpoena, Mr. Hubbell had made use of " 'the contents of his own 
mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in 
the subpoena."86 The Supreme Court concluded by noting that "[t]he 
assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination 
to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox."87 
Like the defendant in Hubbell who had to use his memory to produce 
the subpoenaed documents, a person who provides her name to a police of­
ficer is revealing the contents of her mind-her knowledge of her identity­
to permit the police officer to access potentially incriminating information. 
This is similar to a person providing the combination to a wall safe because 
the person is providing information from her own mind, not a tangible ob­
ject, that enables the police to access information that may be 
incriminating.88 Thus, the statement of a name is testimonial. 
In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to test if y or provide other infor­
mation at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of 
the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceed­
ing is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of th is sect ion, upon the 
request of the United S tates attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to 
give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of 
h is p rivilege against self-incri minat ion, such order to become effective as provided in section 
6002 of this title. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 6003(a) (LexisNexis 2005). 
8 I. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 3 1-32. 
82 . Id. at 4 I. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 41-42 . The subpoena sought eleven categories of documents. Id. at 3 1 .  
85. Id. at 43. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. (citing Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 ( 1988)). 
88. For clarification, a datab ase might be considered distinct in that it is p ublicly accessible 
without a person's name in a way that a wall safe is not accessib le without the combination. How­
ever, the rhetorical p urpose of the analogy is to emphasize the means used to access the information, 
not the ultimate location of the information sought. Also, the information in the database is accessi-
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Likewise, the production of a driver's license89 in non-traffic-stop, pre­
arrest situations should be considered testimonial. The Supreme Court in 
Hiibel expressly did not reach the issue of compelling a person to produce 
identification because the Nevada Supreme Court had interpreted the statute 
Mr. Hiibel was convicted of violating to only require a person to state her 
name .90 Although the majority in Hiibel declined to resolve whether produc­
ing a driver's license is testimonial, the majority did note that the 
"[p]roduction of identity documents might meet the definition as well."91 
The majority further noted that "acts of production may yield testimony es­
tablishing 'the existence, authenticity, and custody of items [the police 
seek] .' "92 A person who produces identification in response to a request 
from a police officer would be asserting that the identification document she 
provided represents her identity. In making this assertion by producing the 
document, the person has made a testimonial statement because she is mak­
ing a "factual assertion."93 Providing identification is not within the class 
of acts the Supreme Court has found to be nontestimonial because the 
facts of interest to a criminal investigation arise from the "factual asser­
tion" the person made by providing the identification document. Further, 
the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits a police officer from conduct­
ing a warrantless search for identification during a non-traffic related 
• 
• 94 investigatory stop. 
ble without a name, but the name provides the means of connecting the informat ion to the person 
whom the officer is questioning. 
89. Driver's l icense is used here for simplicity, although the analysis would apply to any 
other form of govern men t -issued identificat ion ,  such as state iden t ification cards and passports. 
90. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial D ist. Court , 542 U.S.  1 77, 1 85 (2004) ("[T]he Nevada Supreme 
Court has interpreted [ the Nevada statute] to require only t hat a suspect disclose his name." (citing 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial D ist. Court, 59 P.3d 1 20 1 ,  1206 (Nev. 2002))). 
9 1 .  Id. at 1 89. 
92. Id. (quot ing Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 4 1 )  (modification in the original). 
93. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 20 1 ,  2 1 0  ( 1988). 
94. See Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 841 (Alaska 1 975) (holding that a warrantless search 
for the defendan t 's wallet was not within any of the exceptions to the warran t requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment) ;  State v. Webber, 694 A.2d 970, 97 1 (N.H. 1 997) (holding that Part I, Article 1 9  
o f  t h e  New Hampshire Con sti tut ion, which provides that " [ e]very subject hath a right to  be secure 
from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his posses­
sion s," bars a police officer from searching a person 's wallet for ident ificat ion during an 
investigatory stop); State v. Newman , 637 P.2d 143, 1 46 (Or. 198 1 )  (holding that a police officer 
could not search for ident ificat ion for the purpose of transporting a person to an alcohol t reatment 
facility); E. Mart in Est rada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the 
Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 279, 308 n . 1 83 (2005) (discussing the case law and noting that 
most courts have held that an officer cannot search a suspect's wallet for ident ificat ion); Daniel J .  
Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 5 6  Ft.A. L .  REV. 697, 7 1 6  
n .99 (2004) (discussing the case law). But see United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 876--77 (5th 
Cir. 199 1 )  (holding that the Fourth Amendment did n ot prohibit border patrol agen t s  from searching 
t he defendan t 's wallet when the agents had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an illegal 
alien and had refused to state his name and cit izen ship). 
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B. Self-Incrimination by Stating One's Name 
Even if stating one's name is testimonial, the Self-Incrimination Clause 
also requires that such a statement be self-incriminating. This section argues 
that stating one's name to a police officer can be self-incriminating. Section 
l.B. l reviews the requirements for a statement to be incriminating. Section 
l.B.2 explains how a name used to complete a database search meets the re­
quirements for the statement to be considered incriminating. 
1 .  What Circumstances Are Sufficient for a 
Name to Be Self-Incriminating 
The Self-Incrimination Clause may be invoked against disclosures that 
confront a person with "substantial hazards of self-incrimination."95 The invo­
cation of the Self-Incrimination Clause "does not require any special 
combination of words."96 The privilege protects information that either di­
rectly or indirectly incriminates the individual.97 A directly incriminating 
statement is one that supports a criminal conviction by itself.98 This would be 
a statement such as "I killed John Doe." A name alone is unlikely to be direct 
evidence of a crime.99 An indirectly incriminating statement need not itself be 
inculpatory'00 -a statement that only provides a link in the chain of evidence 
is sufficiently incriminating to permit the invocation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 101 For example, statements about others involved in a 
criminal enterprise that implicate the person making the statements as a par­
ticipant in the criminal enterprise, but not in any criminal act, warrant the 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 102 
95. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 ( 1 97 1 )  (plurality opinion). 
96. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 1 62 ( 1955). 
97. Hoffman v. United States, 34 1 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1 95 1 ). 
98. Id. at 486. 
99. The constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder would suggest that having a particular 
name could never be sufficient for a criminal conviction. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10;  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440--62 ( 1 965). 
1 00. Doe v. United States (Doe fl), 487 U.S. 201 ,  208 n.6 ( 1988). 
1 0  I. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 
1 02. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 1 59 ( 1950). In Blau, the defendant had been subpoe­
naed before a grand jury and then a district court to answer questions about her affiliation with the 
Communist Party of Colorado. Id. at 1 5�. In both proceedings the defendant invoked the Fifth 
Amendment, and in the district court she was held to be in contempt. Id. at 160. The questions that the 
defendant refused to answer were: 
"Mrs. Blau, do you know the names of the State officers of the Communist Party of Colorado?" 
"Do you know what the organization of the Communist Party of Colorado is, the table of organi­
zation of the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Were you ever employed by the Communist Party 
of Colorado?" "Mrs. Blau, did you ever have in your possession or custody any of the books and 
records of the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Did you turn the books and records of the Com­
munist Party of Colorado over to any particular person?" "Do you know the names of any persons 
who might now have the books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Could you 
describe to the grand jury any books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?" 
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The standard that the Supreme Court has applied to determine if the 
threat of incrimination is sufficient to permit the invocation of the privilege 
is "whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not 
merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."io3 In applying this 
standard, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self­
incrimination is justifiably invoked when the fact that a person would be 
acknowledging is the existence of, and her possession of, subpoenaed docu­
ments that the government would need to authenticate if the documents 
were obtained from an alternative source. 104 Determining whether the re­
sponse to a particular question would be incriminating is an objective 
determination that is to be made by a court. ios A person who is contemplat­
ing invoking the privilege against self-incrimination is not required to make 
a determination about whether the government is already in possession of 
the information she is considering invoking the privilege to withhold. 106 In 
the context of stating one's name, this means that the right to invoke the 
Self-Incrimination Clause is not negated by the fact that the police may al­
ready be in possession of the person's  name or have a physical description 
that accompanies each name in the database. A person could therefore de­
cline to state her name even if she believed that the police already knew 
her name. io7 
In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the Supreme Court 
explained that a person may refuse to answer a question under the Self­
Incrimination Clause if the question results in a response that provides "in­
vestigatory leads to a criminal prosecution,"w8 unless the question is "neutral 
Id. at 160 n. l .  The Supreme Court h eld t hat th e defendant could h ave reasonably feared th at answer­
i ng th ese questi ons would result i n  charges under th e Smith Act . Id. at 1 60-6 1 .  The Smith Act made 
it a cri me t o, among oth er th ings, " advocat e  knowi ngly th e desirabilit y of overth row of t he Govern­
ment by force or violence; t o  organize or help t o  organi ze any soci et y or group wh ich t each es, 
advocat es or encourages such overth row of t he Government ; t o  be or become a member of such a 
group with knowledge of it s purposes." Id. Th e Supreme Court held th at th e defendant had a ri ght t o  
remain si lent under t he Self-Incri mi nati on Clause in response t o  th e questi ons about her employ­
ment and affi liati on with th e Communist Part y of Colorado. Id. at 1 6 1 .  
1 03. Marchett i v. Unit ed St at es,  390 U.S. 39, 53 ( 1 968) (cit ing R ogers v. Unit ed St at es, 340 
U.S. 367, 374 ( 1 95 1 ); Brown v. W alker, 16 1  U.S. 59 1 ,  600 ( 1 896)). The Supreme Court has i ndi ­
cat ed that th e t est appli ed i n  Marchetti is t he basic t est fo r det ermi ning wh et her th e th reat of 
incrimination fulfills th e incri mi nati on requi rement of t he Self- Incri mi nati on Clause. Unit ed St at es 
v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 1 1 5, 1 28 ( 1980). 
1 04. Unit ed St at es v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 6 1 4  n. 1 3  ( 1 984). 
1 05. Rogers, 340 U.S. at 374 ("As t o  each questi on t o  whi ch a clai m  of privi lege is di rect ed, 
th e court must det ermi ne whet her th e answer t o  t hat parti cular question would subject th e wit ness t o  
a ' real danger' of furth er cri minati on."). 
1 06. Albert son v. Subversive Acti viti es Cont rol Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 8 1  ( 1965) (" The judgment 
as t o  whether a disclosure would be 'i ncri minat ory' h as never been made dependent on an assess­
ment of the informat ion possessed by th e Government at th e ti me of i nt errogati on; t he prot ect ion of 
th e privi lege would be seri ously impai red if th e ri ght t o  invoke it was dependent on such an assess­
ment, wit h all it s uncertainti es."). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 78. 
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on [its] face and directed at the· public at large." 109 The types of questions 
that the Supreme Court has recognized as neutral and directed at the public 
at large have typically been in a "noncriminal and regulatory area of in­
quiry,"1 10 such as income tax questions " '  and questions related to the 
operation of automobiles. 1 12 In Albertson, the Supreme Court explained that 
a question is not considered neutral and directed at the public at large when 
the question is directed at a "highly selective group inherently suspect 
of criminal activities" and in relation to an "area permeated with criminal 
statutes."1 1 3 
A police officer's request for an individual's name would meet both re­
quirements that the Supreme Court employed in Albertson for classifying a 
question as nonneutral. First, an individual being questioned by a police 
officer represents a member of a "highly selective group inherently suspect 
of criminal activity"1 14-specifically the group of individuals that the police 
officer believes either were involved in the alleged criminal activity or have 
information about the alleged criminal activity. A dynamic definition of the 
group is consistent with the Court's analysis in Albertson because that 
analysis was aimed at assessing the context of the questioning, which is by 
definition dynamic. 1 15 Second, a person whose name is requested is being 
questioned by a police officer who has already initiated an investigation into 
potentially criminal conduct. 1 16 The information the officer is seeking is al­
most by definition an investigatory lead for a criminal prosecution. This 
places the request for a person's name in "an area permeated with criminal 
1 09. Id. at 79. The pl ural ity in Byers stated that Albertson articulated the components of the 
"substantial hazards of self- incrimination" requirement. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 
(197 1 )  (plurality opinion). 
1 1 0. Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79. 
1 1 1 . United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 262-64 ( 1 927) (rejecting defendant's assertion 
that compelling him to file a tax return would violate the Fifth Amendment because his income was 
derived from illicit traffic in liquor). 
1 1 2. Byers, 402 U.S. at 432-34 (plurality opinion) (upholding a California statute that re­
quired the driver of an automob ile involved in an accident to provide her name and address). The 
argument in this Note is not undermined by the Byers plural ity's statement that providing a name 
was "neutral." Id. at 432. In Byers, the person's name was being requested in furtherance of the 
state's regulation of automob iles. The plurality opinion emphasized the extent to which requiring a 
driver to provide a name was neutral in a sense comparable to the requirement found to be consis­
tent with the Self-Incrimination Clause in Sullivan, which involved the requirement that an 
individual file a tax return. Id. at 433-34. 
1 1 3 .  Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 (explaining that the exception created in Sullivan did not apply 
to "an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's 
questions [ which related to membership in the communist party] in context might involve the peti­
tioners in the admission of a crucial element of a cri me"). 
1 14. Id. 
1 1 5 .  See Byers, 402 U.S. at 429-3 1 (plurality opinion) (reviewing the Supreme Court's appl i­
cation of the test from Albertson). 
1 1 6. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ,  22-23 ( 1 968) (discussing the interest of the State in 
permitting police officers to investigate a person by approaching and then attempting to elicit addi­
tional information). 
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statutes." 1 11 A police officer asking for a person's name in a non-traffic-stop, 
pre-arrest situation is not asking a neutral question, so the privilege against 
self-incrimination remains available to the person confronting the question. 
Nevertheless, an individual cannot invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination if the privileged communication is "insufficiently incriminat­
ing."1 18 A fact is "insufficiently incriminating" if the government could 
readily establish the information from other sources. 1 19 In Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, the Supreme Court discussed 
when the government can readily establish information from other 
sources. 120 In Bouknight, the respondent, Jacqueline Bouknight, claimed that 
compelling her to produce her child, Maurice, in juvenile court proceedings 
related to allegations of child abuse violated the Self-Incrimination Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 12 1  The Supreme Court stated that Ms. Bouknight 
could not assert the privilege against self-incrimination "upon the theory 
that compliance would assert that the child produced is in fact Maurice" 
because this was "a fact the State could readily establish."122 The Supreme 
Court in Bouknight did not elaborate as to how this fact could be "readily 
establish[ed]";  however, the D .C. Circuit has speculated that this section of 
the analysis in Bouknight was based on the fact that a social worker could 
have testified as to Maurice's identity. 123 So, in Bouknight, the readily avail­
able source was a person employed by the state who was familiar with the 
relevant facts and whose primary purpose at the proceeding was to testify in 
furtherance of the state's objectives. 
In the context of a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation, it is unclear that 
there is a readily available source from which a police officer could easily 
establish a person's name. 124 A police officer questioning a person at best has 
another person at the scene who may or may not have the necessary knowl­
edge and may or may not be willing to cooperate. The lack of a readily 
available source comparable to what was available in Bouknight is also evi­
denced by the decision of state legislatures to impose criminal sanctions for 
failing to state one's name. The imposition of criminal sanctions demon­
strates that there is a unique value to being able to compel the information 
1 1 7. Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79. 
1 1 8. Bait. City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 ( 1 990). 
1 1 9. Id. 
1 20. Id. 
1 2 1 .  Id. at 55 1-54. 
1 22. Id. at 555. 
1 23. United States v. Hubbell, 1 67 F.3d 552, 574 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1 999), ajf'd, 530 U.S. 27 
(2000). 
1 24. The development of face-recognition technology and access to large-scale photographic 
databases could permit the police to use technology to identify an individual. The development of 
such technology would present its own set of constitutional and public policy questions. If such 
technology were otherwise permissible and were implemented on a wide scale, the analysis in this 
Section would need to be re-evaluated. 
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from the individual. 125 The analysis now turns to the implications of an offi­
cer's use of the name to search various databases. 126 
2. How a Name Links a Person to Incriminating 
Information in Databases 
By stating her name, a person may enable a database search that pro­
vides the police with information that furthers a criminal investigation. 1 27 
Databases, because of their tremendous scope, can provide law enforcement 
with wide-ranging information about a person. 128 The different reasons for 
law enforcement's interest in a name provide a framework for understanding 
a name's heightened significance in the context of modern law enforcement 
databases. The traditional use of a name is to provide a means of referencing 
a specific person and contacting that person later. Law enforcement also 
uses a person's name as a means of linking information to that person. 129 An 
important sub-category of this type of use of a name occurs when law en­
forcement believes a particular person has committed a specific crime and is 
endeavoring to apprehend that person. 130 
The characteristics of modern databases primarily implicate the scale of 
information that law enforcement may link to a person. Without the ability 
to search databases, an officer is limited to information available in the im­
mediate surroundings with which to link a person to a crime. In such a 
situation, any information that the person declines to provide might be ob­
tained from other sources at the scene. The other sources available to an 
officer at the scene include the officer's observations of the circumstances 
and information obtained from other people present at the scene. In contrast, 
when a person provides her name to a police officer, the officer is able to 
link her to information through database searches. Under these circum­
stances, the person is linked to information that is not available through 
1 25 .  Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 8 1  ( 1 965) (noting that sanc­
tions for failing to provide the information countered the suggestion that the information was of no 
utility). 
1 26. The inquiry here does not involve the propriety of the government creating such data­
bases or accessing such databases created by commercial providers. The independent 
constitutionality of such databases is not relevant for the analysis of this Note. Presumably, the Fifth 
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause does not bar the creation of such databases. See Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391 ,  4 1 1 ( 1976) (finding the compelled production of a document to be 
consistent with the Self-Incrimination Clause); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000). 
1 27.  See sources cited supra note 32 (discussing what information a police officer needs in 
order to successfully execute a database search). 
1 28. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77, 1 96 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly in the 
hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases."); Estrada, supra note 
94, at 305 ("[T]he Government has the capacity to use your name or other nonpublic identifying 
information to access unparalleled amounts of personal information."). 
1 29. Estrada, supra note 94, at 305--06 (discussing police use of identifying information, such 
as a name, as a means of linking a person to a particular event). 
1 30. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 1 85-86 (discussing the role of a name in pursuing a suspect). 
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other means. This type of connection represents the core of the Self­
Incrimination Clause's protection against indirect self-incrimination. 131 
Information in a database has been held to provide a basis for reasonable 
suspicion. 132 The contents of various databases become important if the in­
formation in databases has the potential to provide a basis for criminal 
investigations and to link a person to otherwise unavailable information. The 
depth and detail of the information available through the different databases 
is expansive. 133 Briefly, these databases contain standard biographical infor­
mation, biometric identifiers, licenses (State and Federal), filings with 
government agencies, property ownership, criminal records,  government 
watch lists, and employment information. 134 The information contained in 
the various databases is such that it facilitates police investigations and can "d b . ., 135 prov1 e a as1s ior arrest. 
The results of a database search can provide incriminating information 
in a variety of ways. First, if the police officer is investigating a person for a 
particular type of criminal activity, then a database search may provide in­
formation that either supports or does not support the suspicions that the 
officer already has. 136 For example, if the police officer suspects that a per­
son is engaging in drug-related activity, then database results, whether prior 
convictions or activity that the officer believes is consistent with drug­
related activity, would guide the officer's further investigation. 137 Another 
example would be if the database search led to the discovery of an arrest 
1 3 1 .  Maness v. Meyers, 419  U.S. 449, 461 ( 1 975) ("This Court has always broadly construed 
its protection to assure that an individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be 
used against him as an accused in a criminal action. The protection does not merely encompass 
evidence which may lead to criminal conviction, but includes information which would furnish a 
link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution, as well as evidence which an individual 
reasonably bel ieves could be used against him in a criminal prosecution." (citations omitted)); 
Hoffman v. United States, 34 1 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1 95 1 ). 
1 32. In United States v. Ornelas, after initially being reversed by the Supreme Court for ap­
plying the wrong standard of review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of 
reasonable suspicion based in part on information from a law enforcement database. United States v. 
Ornelas-Ledesma, 1 6  F.3d 7 1 4, 7 1 6- 1 7  (7th Cir. 1 994) (affirming, under clearly erroneous review, 
the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion based on information from the Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs Information System combined with the individuals fitting a "drug courier" pro­
file), vacated, 5 1 7  U.S. 690 ( 1996) (vacating the court of appeals decision based on the court having 
applied the incorrect standard of review), remanded to United States v. Ornelas, Nos. 94-3349/94-
3350, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 23388, at *2-3, 1996 WL 508569, at * l  (7th C ir. Sep. 4, 1 996) (un­
published) (affirming, under de nova review, the district court's finding of probable cause based in 
part on information in the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System). 
1 33.  The review of databases presented here is not intended to be comprehensive. The data­
bases presented are used only for illustrative purposes. The analysis of the permissibility of invoking 
the privilege against self-incrimination is not l imited to the databases discussed. 
1 34. The Appendix, infra, outlines the details of the information provided in each database. 
1 35. Steinbock, supra note 94, at 7 17. 
1 36. Id. 
1 37 .  Id. a t  7 1 7- 1 8. This example o f  a drug-related investigation i n  which information from a 
database is used is derived from an example in Steinbock, id. For a case discussing the use of data­
base information in furtherance of a drug-related investigation, see Ornelas, 1 996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23388, at *2-3, 1996 WL 508569, at * 1 ,  and supra note 1 32 (providing the facts of the case and the 
full appellate history). 
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warrant for the same crime that the questioning officer thinks the person is 
committing. A specific example of this would be an officer who suspects a 
person is currently distributing narcotics and the results of a database search 
reveal an arrest warrant for narcotics distribution. The existence of an arrest 
warrant itself is not incriminating, however, because in stating her name the 
person would not provide any evidence that would be used in proving the 
crime for which the warrant was issued. 138 Second, the breadth of the data­
base information combined with the officer's observations at the scene 
could be incriminating. This could take the form of the hypothetical dis­
cussed at the beginning of this Note. In that hypothetical, the officer obtains 
information about certain licenses obtained from the government and pur­
chases of the precursors for the production of methamphetarnine. These 
suggest, broadly, the means by which a database search based on a person's 
name could lead to incriminating information. 
C. Sanctions for Declining to State One's 
Name Constitute Compulsion 
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was intended to pre­
vent the use of legal compulsion to extract facts from the accused that would 
incriminate her. 139 Preventing compelled statements furthers the individual­
State balance in relation to the competing interests of the government in 
prosecuting criminals and of the people in being left alone. 140 The accused is 
1 38. State v. Brown, 2004-0hio-4058, 'll'II 23-27 (Ct. App.) (holding that existence of an out­
standing warrant does not meet the incrimination requirement for invoking the Self-Incrimination 
Clause because the identifying information only enabled the officer to take the defendant into cus­
tody but did not assist in proving the underlying charge); Schreyer v. State, No. 05-03-01 1 27-CR, 
2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 592 1 ,  at *40-4 1 ,  2005 WI.. 1 793 1 93, at *3 (Tex. App. July 29, 2005) (adopt­
ing the reasoning from State v. Brown). But see Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth 
Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1 857, 1 895-96 (2005) ("The most 
obvious way disclosure of identity can be incriminating is when suspects have a warrant out for their 
arrests. Indeed, [in Hiibel] this was one of the important government interests the Court pointed to 
in its Fourth Amendment analysis discussing the reasonableness of requiring disclosure."); Stein­
bock, supra note 94, at 7 1 8  (suggesting that warrants would always be incriminating). 
1 39. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S . 20 1 ,  2 1 2  ( 1988) ("Historically, the privilege was 
intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn communication 
of facts which would incriminate him. S uch was the process of the ecclesiastical courts and the Star 
Chamber-the inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath and compelling him to 
answer questions designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence from another source."); 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-7 1 ( 1 976). 
1 40. The S upreme Court has stated: 
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the development of 
our Iiberty-'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' "  It re­
flects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject 
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our 
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear 
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense 
of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave 
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the gov­
ernment in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," our respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave 
where he may lead a private life," our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realiza-
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free to refuse to be a tool that assists the prosecution in conv1ctmg her. 141 
There are two potential sources of pressure that make stating one's name 
compelled: local stop-and-identify statutes that require an individual to pro­
vide her name in response to a request from a police officer, 142 and local 
statutes that make disobeying a lawful order from a police officer a crime. 143 
Both of these types of statutes would subject an individual who declines to 
state her name to criminal sanctions. 
Stop-and-identify statutes, which require a person to provide her name 
in response to a request from a police officer, vary from state to state. 144 In 
some states, the statutes provide that a police officer conducting any investi­
gation has the authority to request a person's name. 145 In these states, the 
criminal penalties would arise from the state's statute making it a criminal 
offense to disobey the lawful request of a police officer. 146 The statutes at 
tion that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the 
innocent." 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 ( 1 964) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
1 4 1 .  See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S .  422, 427 ( 1 956). 
1 42. See, e.g. , N EV. REV. STAT. § 1 7 1 . 1 23 (2003). The statute states :  
I .  Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circum­
stances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is 
about to commit a crime. 
2. Any peace officer may detain any person the officer encounters under circumstances 
which reasonably indicate that the person has violated or is violating the conditions of 
his parole or probation. 
3. The of icer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity 
and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so de­
tained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of 
any peace of icer. 
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes 
of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes. The detention must not extend 
beyond the place or the immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first ef­
fected, unless the person is arrested. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
1 43. See, e.g., NEV. REV. S TAT. § 1 99.280 (2003) ("A person who, in any case or under any 
circumstances not otherwise specially provided for, willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public 
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office shall be punished 
. . . .  "). 
1 44. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77, 1 82-85 (2004) (discussing stop-and­
identify statutes); Kolender v. Lawson, 46 1 U.S. 352 ( 1 983) (invalidating a California stop-and­
identify statute because the statute did not provide a standard for determining when a person had 
complied with the statute); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 ( 1 979) (invalidating a conviction under the 
Texas stop-and-identify statute because the initial stop violated the Fourth Amendment); Papachris­
tou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S .  1 56 ( 1972) (invalidating Florida's general vagrancy law for vagueness). 
1 45. ALA. CODE § 1 5-5-30 (LexisNexis 1 995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1 6-3- 103(1 )  ( 1 997); 725 
ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 5/1 07- 14 (West 1 992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1 )  ( 1 995); Mo. REV. 
STAT. § 84.7 1 0(2) (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 ( 1 995); NEV. R EV. STAT. § 1 7 1 . 1 23(3) (2003); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (2001 ); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.50(1 )  (McKinney 2004); N.0. 
CENT. CODE § 29-29-2 1 ( 199 1 ); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 1 2-7-1  (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-1 5  
(2003); WIS. S TA T. § 968.24 ( 1998). 
1 46. ALA. CODE § 1 3A-I0-2 (LexisNexis 1994) (providing that a person commits the offense of 
obstructing governmental operations by intentionally interfering with a public servant performing a 
government function); Cow. REV. STAT. § 1 8-8-104(l )(a) ( 1 997) (providing that a person obstructs a 
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issue in Hiibel were structured in this manner-a statute authorizing a po­
lice officer to request a person's name and a statute criminalizing a refusal 
to obey an order of a police officer. 147 Some states have stop-and-identify 
statutes that are incorporated into another offense, typically loitering. 148 Un­
der either of these statutory structures, a person who refuses to provide her 
name to a police officer would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 149 
The imposition of penalties for refusing to state one's name makes the 
statement compelled. The stop-and-identify statutes discussed in this Note 
would impose criminal sanctions on people who refuse to state their 
names. 150 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a statement is consid­
ered compelled if the government would impose a penalty on the person for 
refusing to make the statement based on her right under the Fifth Amend­
ment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 15 1  Even if such statutes did not impose 
peace officer by hindering a peace officer's enforcement of penal law); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/3 1 - 1  (West 2003) (providing that a person commits a class A misdemeanor by knowingly obstruct­
ing a peace officer's performance of her official duty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2 1 -3808(a) ( 1995) 
(providing that a person commits a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the offense the officer is 
investigating, by intentionally interfering with an officer's official duty); Mo. REV. STAT. § 576.030 
(2000) (providing that a person commits a misdemeanor by obstructing government operations); 
NEB. REV. STAT § 28-906 ( 1995) (providing that a person commits a misdemeanor by obstructing a 
peace officer's enforcement of penal law); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003) (providing that ob­
structing or willfully resisting a public officer is a misdemeanor, so long as a dangerous weapon is 
not used); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 642: I ( 1996) (providing that a person commits a misdemeanor 
by engaging in unlawful conduct that interferes with a public servant); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1 95.05 
(Gould 2005) (providing that a person commits a misdemeanor by preventing a public servant from 
performing an official duty); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1 2 . 1 -08-01 ( 1 997) (providing that a person com­
mits a misdemeanor by intentionally hindering the administration of law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1 1 -32-
1 (2002) (providing that a person who obstructs an officer is subject to up to one year in jail or a five 
hundred dollar fine); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301  (2003) (providing that a person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor if she engages in unlawful conduct that interferes with a public servant's performance 
of official duties); Wis. STAT. § 946.4 1 ( 1 998) (providing that a person commits a misdemeanor by 
obstructing a police officer who is acting in her official capacity). But see Hicks v. State, 63 1 A.2d 6, 
9 (Del. 1 992) (holding that although title 1 1 , section l 902(a) of the Delaware Code provides police 
officers with the authority to request an individual's name, refusal to provide a name is not a basis 
for arrest). 
147. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 1 8 1-82. 
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-7 1 -2 1 3(a)( I)  ( 1 997) (making a person who fails to identify herself 
guilty of loitering); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 1 1 , § 1 32 1  (6) (200 I) (making a person who fails to identify 
herself guilty of loitering); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (2) (West 2000) (making a person who fails 
to identify herself guilty of loitering, a second degree misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 1 6- l  l -36(b) 
(2003) (making a person who fails to identify herself guilty of loitering, a misdemeanor); N.M. 
STAT. § 30-22-3 (2004) (classifying concealing one's identity from a public officer as a petty mis­
demeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1 983 (2004) (providing that if a person fails to provide her 
name to a police officer, she is to be taken before a district court judge where she will be held in 
contempt if she again fails to provide her name); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). 
149. See supra notes 1 45 ,  146 & 148. 
1 50. See supra notes 1 45 ,  146 & 148 and accompanying text. 
1 5 1 .  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 3 14, 3 16-19,  327-30 ( 1999) (holding that the judge 
could not impose a greater sentence based on a negative inference from the defendant's decision not 
to testify at sentencing after entering a guilty plea); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 43 1 U.S. 801 ,  803-
05 (I 977) (holding that a New York state statute that divested a political party official of all party 
offices and imposed a five-year ban on holding any party or public offices if he refused to testify 
before a grand jury violated the Self-Incrimination Clause); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 
274-75, 279 ( 1968) (holding that firing a police officer because he refused to testify before a grand 
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criminal sanctions, other sanctions imposed by the State would be sufficient, 
because the statement would still be made under the threat of a penalty. 152 
Therefore, a person who states her name when confronted with one of these 
. aki 11 d 153 statutes 1s m ng a compe e statement. 
Each of the three elements required for the application of the Self­
Incrimination Clause can be present when a police officer requests a person 
to provide her name so that the officer can complete a database search. The 
presence of the three elements makes it permissible for an person to decline 
to answer the officer's question based on the privilege against self­
incrimination. 154 Although a person might have such a right, questions re­
main as to the breadth of its application. 
II. CONTOURS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT' S 
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE 
A police officer's request that a person state her name under the previ­
ously reviewed circumstances represents a basis for invoking the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Demonstrating the permissibility of invoking the 
privilege against self-incrimination, however, does not define the contours 
of the privilege's practical application. Section II.A discusses the specific 
circumstances under which a person could invoke the Fifth Amendment's 
Self-Incrimination Clause and refuse to state her name. Section 11.B evalu­
ates the available remedies when a person is arrested for refusing to state her 
name. Section 11.C discusses whether law enforcement would be unduly 
impaired if a person is permitted to invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination to justify refusing to state her name. Section 11.D compares 
the protections outlined in Sections II.A and 11.B to the historical scope of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
j ury violated the Self-Incrimination Clause); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494-95, 499-500 
( 1 967) (invalidating, based on the Self-Incrimination Clause, a New Jersey statute that would have 
caused a group of police officers to lose their jobs if they did not testify in their prosecution for their 
involvement in a ticket-fixing scheme); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609-1 5  ( 1 965) (holding 
that the prosecutor and judge commenting that the jury was free to draw a negative inference from 
the defendant's decision not to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause). 
1 52. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 4 1 4  U.S. 70, 83 ( 1973) (invalidating a New York state statute that 
disqualified architects from future contracts with the state because they refused to sign a waiver of 
immunity and then testify before a grand jury). 
1 53. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768-69 (2003) (plurality opinion) (citing Griffin 
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 6 14  ( 1965)); Cunningham, 43 1 U.S. at 805 ("(W]hen a State compels 
testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, 
that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot be used against the decla­
rant in a subsequent criminal prosecution."). 
1 54. See infra Section Il.B. 
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A. Who Can Decline to State Her Name? 
The Self-Incrimination Clause only shields a person from making state­
ments that could provide a basis for a criminal prosecution. 155 A statement 
that is protected confronts the person with "a real and probable danger" of 
incrimination that is not "of an imaginary and unsubstantial character."156 A 
court is the final adj udicator of whether a person is justified in invoking the 
privilege. 157 The court can require the person to answer "if 'it clearly appears 
to the court that [the person invoking the privilege] is mistaken.' " 158 The 
standard that the Supreme Court has applied to determine if the threat of 
incrimination is sufficient to permit the invocation of the privilege is 
"whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ' real,' and not merely 
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."159 
Assessing how broadly the Self-Incrimination Clause protects individu­
als who decline to state their names depends on whether individuals could 
generally find that the results of database searches present "a real and prob­
able danger" of incrimination, that is not "of an imaginary and unsubstantial 
character."160 Individuals typically lack knowledge of what information spe­
cific to them is contained in various databases. 161 This shifts the analysis to 
what inferences a person could make based on general information about 
the databases. 162 This section reviews the implications of various levels of 
1 55. Brown v. Walker, 1 6 1  U.S. 59 1 ,  595-97, 605-06 ( 1 896) (holding that the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not permit an individual to refuse to answer question s  that could not 
provide incriminating evidence). 
1 56. Id. at 608 ("[T]hat the witness was not protected by his pardon against an impeachment 
by the house of commons, is not a real and probable danger, with reference to the ordinary opera­
tions of the law in the ordinary courts, but ·a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, 
having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no 
reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.' Such dangers it was never the object of the 
provision to obviate." (quoting Queen v. Boyes, ( 1 86 1 )  1 Best & S. 3 1 1  (Q.B.))). For a more recent 
discussion of the requirements for incrimination , see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PRO­
CEDURE § 8 . 1  O(a) (2d ed. 1 999) ("While the concept of potential incrimination encompasses a great 
deal, it is not without limits. The threat of incrimination is l imited only to crimin al liability, and that 
liability must relate to the witness himself, not others. The threat must be 'real and appreciable,' not 
' imaginary and unsubstan tial.' " (footnotes omitted)). 
1 57 .  Hoffman v. Un ited States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1 95 1 ); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 
367, 374 ( 1 95 1 ). 
158.  Hoffman, 341 U.S. at  486 (quoting Temple v.  Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 ( 188 1 )). 
1 59. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 ( 1968) (citing Rogers, 340 U.S. at 374; 
Brown, 1 6 1  U.S. at 600). For examples of the Supreme Court's later applications of this tc:st, see 
United States v. Doe (Doe /), 465 U.S. 605, 6 14  n. 1 3  ( 1984) and United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 
U.S. 1 1 5, 1 28-29 ( 1 980). 
1 60. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 608. 
1 6 1 .  See generally Hoofnagle, supra note 26. 
1 62. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial D ist. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77,  1 89-90 (2004); Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 44 1 ,  444-45 ( 1972) ("[The privilege against self incrimination] protects against any 
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could 
lead to other evidence that might be so used."); Brown, 1 6 1  U .S. at 599 ("It was held, however, by 
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn that 'to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the 
court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the n ature of the evidence which the witness 
is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being 
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knowledge that a person might have about the contents of the databases, 
concluding that the results of a database search can represent a real 
and probable danger of incrimination for individuals with all levels 
of knowledge. 
1 .  A Person with Knowledge of the Contents of the Databases 
A person with knowledge or a reasonable belief that at least one data­
base contains incriminating information about her has a basis for asserting 
the privilege. 163 This category would include a person who knows that link­
ing her to her current geographic location would assist an ongoing 
investigation in which she is a suspect. In addition, a person who knows that 
the contents of the databases are otherwise incriminating would be justified 
in invoking the privilege. For example, a felon who is in possession of a 
firearm would know that a database search would reveal her prior conviction 
and indicate to a police officer that she is currently committing a crime. 164 
Such a person would have a basis for asserting the privilege to refuse to 
state her name. 
2 .  A Person without Knowledge of the Contents of the Databases 
In some circumstances, a person without specific knowledge of the in­
formation in the databases could still infer a real and probable danger that 
she may incriminate herself by revealing her name to a police officer. The 
potential for any individual to make the inference that stating her name will 
be incriminating rests on the nature and scope of the databases. In order to 
ascertain what types of circumstances may justify the invocation of the Self­
Incrimination Clause by individuals without specific knowledge of the data­
bases, this Section reviews some of the situations in which a person could 
infer that the databases are incriminating without specific knowledge of the 
contents of the databases. Evaluating the circumstances where a person 
could infer the presence of incriminating information in the databases is 
compelled to answer,' although 'if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, 
great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular ques­
tion."' (quoting Queen v. Boyes, ( 1 86 1 )  I Best & S. 3 1 1 ,  32 1 (Q.B.))). 
163. This Note focuses on how the interrelationship between a person's name and various 
government databases provides a basis for a person to invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination. The Note's analytic framework could be applied to a situation in which a person 
knows her name will incriminate her regardless of the existence of the databases reviewed in 
this Note. 
Id. 
1 64. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224f (2005). The statute states: 
( I) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person convicted of a felony shall not possess, use, 
transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state . . . .  
(3) A person who possesses, uses, transports, sells, purchases, canies, ships, receives, or dis­
tributes a firearm in violation of this section is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than 5 years, or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. 
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necessary because police-accessible databases do not generally permit peo­
ple to regularly review the information that the databases contain about 
them. 165 The lack of access alone does not provide a basis for a person to 
infer that all the databases contain information that might incriminate her. 166 
First, a person may infer that the accumulation of time and place infor­
mation from prior stops will be incriminating. Each database search 
conducted by an officer provides an opportunity to develop a more complete 
profile of the person by facilitating the addition of information about the 
person. 167 For instance, each encounter provides the police with the potential 
to enter information about a person's location at a specific time. 168 Time and 
place information could be analyzed for patterns of movement consistent 
with criminal activity and could place the individual in the vicinity of a 
crime or in a location where the police expected a particular criminal. The 
databases also add the potential to conduct searches for individuals who do 
not have a connection to a particular area. This suggests that the time and 
place information created by requiring a person to state her name without 
being arrested makes available information that could facilitate extensive 
criminal investigations, thus rendering one's name incriminating. 
Second, stating one's name could provide a basis for a more immediate 
threat by providing the direct link to incriminating evidence-subjecting a 
person to criminal liability in two ways. The first example of this would be a 
person being charged with lying to a government official after a database 
search conducted using her name revealed that a statement she had made to 
the police officer prior to stating her name was false. 169 The second example 
1 65. See Hoofnagle, supra note 26, at 622-28. Although some of the databases might permit a 
person to review partial or complete versions of her information, this does not allow that person to 
ascertain the contents of other databases. 
1 66. Brown, 1 6 1  U.S. at 608 (noting the insufficiency of a "bare possibility" of incrimination 
as a basis for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination). 
1 67. See 28 C.F.R. § 1 6.96(p)( l )-(2) (2005) (exempting the NCIC from the requirements of 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(e)( l )). 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)( l )  provides that "[e]ach agency that maintains a system of 
records shall- ( I )  maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant 
and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by 
executive order of the President . . . .  " This permits the NCIC to contain information beyond arrest 
and disposition information. See 28 C.F.R. § 1 6.96(q)(4) ("Exemptions from the particular subsec­
tions are justified for the following reasons . . .  (4) From subsection (e)( l )  because it is impossible to 
state with any degree of certainty that all information in these records is relevant to accomplish a 
purpose of the FBI, even though acquisition of the records from state and local law enforcement 
agencies is based on a statutory requirement. In view of the number of records in the system, it is 
impossible to review them for relevancy."). 
1 68. Criminal History Record Information, supra note 32, at 49; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS­
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: 2002 
OVERVIEW 7, 46 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cspsl02.pdf (listing the 
states that require transaction logs, which detail each time an individual accesses the databases). 
1 69. E.g., 1 8  U.S.C. § 1 00 1  (2005). The statute states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction 
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, know­
ingly and willfully-
( 1 )  falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; 
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of this would be the combination of the information in the databases with 
the surrounding circumstances providing an officer with probable cause for 
arrest. 110 Determining if the circumstances support a belief in a real and 
probable danger of incrimination depends on the attendant circumstances 
and the individual's history. For instance, a person's current location could 
be relevant if the police classify the area as a "high-crime area,"171 or if a 
person believes that databases contain information about her prior activities 
in the neighborhood. 112 Or, a person may be in a "high narcotics crime" 
area, 173 have recently traveled out of the country, and have also recently 
made a large cash transaction. The second two pieces of information could 
be available through various databases. A person in this type of situation 
could reasonably believe that there is a real and probable danger her name 
will provide a link to evidence in support of a narcotics conviction. These 
factual situations could apply to many individuals, thus providing those in­
dividuals with a basis to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination as a 
legal justification for refusing to state their names. 
3. Implications of the Contents of the Databases 
Being Made Publicly Accessible 
The lack-of-knowledge basis for inferring the existence of potentially 
incriminating information would remain unchanged even if individuals were 
(2) makes any materially false. fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any mate­
rially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years . . .  or both. 
Id. Likewise, Tux. PENAL CODE ANN . § 37.08 (Vernon 2005), provides: 
Id. 
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive, he knowingly makes a false state­
ment that is material to a criminal investigation and makes the statement to: 
( 1 )  a peace officer conducting the investigation; or 
(2) any employee of a law enforcement agency that is authorized by the agency to con­
duct the investigation and that the actor knows is conducting the investigation. 
(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor. 
1 70. See United States v. Ornelas, Nos. 94-3349/94-3350, 1 996 U.S. App. LEXIS 23388, at 
*2-3, 1 996 WL 508569, at * I  (7th Cir. Sep. 4, 1996) (unpublished) (affirming the district court's 
finding of probable cause based in part on information in the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs In­
formation System). 
1 7 1 .  See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 ( 1 972) (holding that the fact that a stop 
occurred in a "high-crime area" is a relevant factor in Terry analysis); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 1 19, 1 24 (2000) (holding that presence in a "high-crime area" does not alone give rise to 
"a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime"). 
1 72. Support for either of these beliefs would necessarily derive from the person's prior ex­
periences, such as time in the neighborhood and prior encounters with the police. 
173 .  See, e.g. , United States v. Sprinkle, 1 06 F.3d 6 13, 6 1 7  (4th Cir. 1 997) (discussing pres­
ence in a "high narcotics crime" area as one factor that supports reasonable suspicion). 
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granted the right to access all of the databases because individuals would 
not be obligated to review the databases. The Self-Incrimination Clause bars 
a person from being obligated to provide information that assists the State in 
finding incriminating information about her. 174 Requiring a person to ac­
tively review the information in various databases to confirm a lack of 
support for a criminal conviction imposes an obligation on that person to 
confirm her innocence and precludes individuals from maintaining a passive 
role in the efforts of the State to prosecute them. 
Even if individuals could freely and regularly review the information 
contained in the various databases, it does not necessarily follow that indi­
viduals would ascertain the incriminating elements. The consequences of a 
person being unable to recognize the incriminating information in the data­
bases depends on whether the person already has a basis to infer a real and 
probable danger of incrimination from stating her name. First, if the person 
already had a basis to infer a real and probable danger of incrimination from 
stating her name and her review of the database to which she was granted 
access did not indicate that her inference was incorrect, then she could still 
refuse to state her name. Second, if the person already had a basis to infer a 
real and probable danger of incrimination from stating her name and her 
review of the database to which she was granted access refuted that basis, 
she could no longer refuse to state her name. Third, if the person did not 
already have a basis to infer a real and probable danger of incrimination 
from stating her name and her review of the database to which she was 
granted access did not provide a basis to infer a real and probable danger of 
incrimination, then she could not refuse to state her name. These three pos­
sible scenarios mean that the contents of the databases being freely 
accessible would not necessarily negate the other bases discussed in this 
Note on which a person could conclude that stating her name would be in­
criminating. The inability of individuals to recognize the incriminating 
information in the databases represents a pragmatic concern independent of 
the aforementioned constitutional problem. The training and experience of 
police officers and other government agents enables them to more effec­
tively discern evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Therefore, the databases 
being made publicly accessible would not affect the implications of com­
puter databases for the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
1 74. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 ( 1966) ('To maintain a 'fair state-individual 
balance,' to require the government 'to shoulder the entire load,' to respect the inviolability of the 
human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking 
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than 
by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." (citation omitted)); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ,  8 ( 1 964) ("The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same 
privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no 
penalty, as held in [Twining v. New Jersey, 2 1 1 U.S. 78 ( 1908)], for such silence."). 
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B. Process of Invocation and Remedies 
If a person being questioned by a police officer in a non-traffic-stop, pre­
arrest situation believes that stating her name will be incriminating consis­
tent with the analysis of the prior section, then she may decline to state her 
name and invoke the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause without 
explaining why her name might lead to incriminating information. Beyond 
one's name, this analysis would extend to other uniquely identifying infor­
mation, such as a Social Security Number, that could provide a police 
officer with sufficient information to conduct searches of various databases. 
An individual's right under the Self-Incrimination Clause bars the impo­
sition of sanctions, criminal or otherwise, on her for the invocation of her 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 175 This renders statutes 176 
that require a person to state her name in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situa­
tion unconstitutional. This also precludes a request for a person's name in a 
non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation from being considered a "lawful order" 
for the purposes of statutes177 that criminalize disobeying the "lawful order" 
of a police officer. Section 11.B. l discusses the procedures that should occur 
when a person refuses to state her name. Section Il.B .2 discusses what 
remedies are appropriate when a person is arrested for refusing to state 
her name. 
1 .  Pennissible Scope of Invocation 
The foregoing analysis of the Self-Incrimination Clause has only dem­
onstrated that some subset of the population is justified in invoking the Self­
Incrimination Clause to refuse to state a name. The rights of the individuals 
j ustified in invoking the Self-Incrimination Clause can only be protected, 
however, if everyone is permitted to refuse to state a name based on the 
Self-Incrimination Clause. A police officer who confronts a person who re­
fuses to state a name may believe that the person lacks a sufficient basis for 
invoking the Self-Incrimination Clause. If the officer arrests the person, the 
officer will be able to obtain the person's name for booking purposes, 178 
thereby negating the person's ability to avoid incriminating herself. 
There are four reasons for barring an officer from arresting a person 
whom the officer believes has an insufficient basis for invoking the privilege. 
1 75. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768-69 (2003) (plurality opinion) (citing Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 ( 1 965)); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 3 1 4, 3 16-- 19, 327-30 ( 1 999); 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 439 ( 1 984); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 43 1 U.S. 80 1 ,  805 
( 1 977); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 274-75, 279 ( 1 968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 
493, 499-500 ( 1 967); supra notes 1 5 1  & 1 53 (explaining the particular penalties barred in the cited 
cases). 
1 76. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (citing the applicable statutes). 
1 77. See supra notes 1 45-146 and accompanying text (citing the applicable statutes). 
1 78. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 60 1-02 ( 1 990) (holding that the response of a 
person under arrest to a request for her name is not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause be­
cause the information is being sought for record-keeping purposes and is related to the 
administrative function of the police). 
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First, permitting an officer to make such an arrest provides a strong incen­
tive for police officers to intentionally circumvent the Self-Incrimination 
Clause. 179 Enforcing the Self-Incrimination Clause in a manner that encour­
ages officers to circumvent the privilege undermines the ability of the Self­
Incrimination Clause to provide any substantive protection. Second, in most 
scenarios police officers will not have sufficient information about the basis 
for the person 's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination to de­
termine if the invocation is legitimate. 180 This is so because without the 
person's name, the officer will not know what information the databases will 
reveal. Related to this consideration, it would be difficult for the person to 
explain to the police officer her basis for believing that her name will be 
incriminating without revealing incriminating information. Third, barring 
arrest in this context provides a rule that will be simple to administer. An 
alternative rule would require some ex post assessment of the officer's on­
scene determination.18 1 Fourth, barring arrest for invoking the privilege 
would avoid any of the problems created by only allowing a narrow class of 
individuals to refuse to state their names. In this context, police officers 
would have a strong incentive to continue to pursue the person because the 
person has already signaled her guilt. 182 This would create a de facto penalty 
of increased police scrutiny for invoking the privilege against self­
incrimination. This de facto penalty would be contrary to the bar on impos­
ing penalties on individuals who invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination. 183 For these reasons, refusing to state a name based on the 
Self-Incrimination Clause is an insufficient basis for arrest. 
2. Remedy If a Person Is Arrested 
Even if the aforementioned rule were adopted and police officers could 
not arrest a person for refusing to state her name, the question of remedy 
remains for people who are arrested based on their refusal to state a name in 
a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation. If the charges brought against the 
1 79. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("We have 
explained that '[t]he natural concern which underlies [these] decisions is that an inability to protect 
the right at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.' " (modifica­
tions in the original) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 4 1 7  U.S. 433, 440-41 ( 1974))). 
1 80. Pardo, supra note 1 38, at 1 896. 
1 8 1 .  This alternative rule would require developing a test that officers could reasonably and 
fairly apply in the field. Further, the alternative rule would need a means of assessing whether the 
officer had applied the test reasonably and fairly in each case. 
1 82. See M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel: The Criminalization of Silence, 2004 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 357, 386 (discussing the oddity of permitting only those that definitively know of 
their guilt to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination). 
1 83. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 6 1 4  ( 1965) ("It cuts down on the privilege by 
making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to 
facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that 
comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional 
privilege. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer 
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.") 
(citation omitted); supra notes 1 5 1 ,  1 5 3  and accompanying text. 
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individual all related to her refusal to state her name, then a remedy com­
mensurate with the right violated would require that the illegally arrested 
person be released and the record of the incident expunged. 184 
A challenging situation arises when the individual is arrested and is then 
implicated in a separate crime as a result of the database search that was 
conducted based on the information she was required to provide after she 
was arrested. When a person who has previously refused to state her name 
provides her name to the police after being arrested, she is not making a 
voluntary statement. 18s The person providing her name has previously indi­
cated her intent to withhold her name from the police based on the Self­
Incrimination Clause. The appropriate remedy for the information obtained 
as a result of the illegal arrest turns on whether the charge can stand alone. If 
expunging the information gained as a result of compelling the person to 
state her name186 removes a necessary element of the separate charge, then 
the separate charge should also be dropped. 187 A court would determine if the 
police could sustain the charge absent the combination of information that 
was made possible by the illegal arrest-if not, the charge should be 
dropped. For example, if the person had an outstanding arrest warrant, then 
the government could prove the commission of the criminal charge in the 
arrest warrant without any information obtained in the course of the illegal 
arrest. 
If the other charge remains despite the expunging of the record, a differ­
ent situation is presented. In this situation, the Self-Incrimination Clause 
would not bar the individual from being prosecuted for a criminal act that 
the State can prove without the information obtained as a result of the illegal 
arrest. 188 If nothing obtained as a result of the information the person 
1 84. See United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Congress has not ex­
pressly granted to the federal courts a general power to expunge criminal records. Nevertheless, we 
have asserted that federal courts have inherent authority to expunge criminal records in appropriate 
and extraordinary cases. We have held that in criminal proceedings 'district courts possess ancillary 
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records.' " (quoting United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1 005, 1 0 1 4  
(9th Cir. 2000))), cert. denied, 1 25 S. Ct. 91 1 (2005). Imposing the right t o  have the information 
expunged may not be sufficient without improvements in the recordkeeping policies applied to the 
various databases. Hoofnagle, supra note 26, at 622-23 (noting the problems of effectively remov­
ing inaccurate or inappropriately obtained information from all affected databases). 
1 85.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (describing the standard for 
determining whether a confession is voluntary as being the "totality of all the surrounding circum­
stances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation" (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 4 1 2  U.S. 2 1 8, 226 ( 1 973))). Although Dickerson concerned the stan­
dard for coercion in reference to Miranda warnings, the Court indicated that a voluntariness inquiry 
is aimed at determining whether a person's "will was overborne." Dickerson, 530 at 434 (quoting 
Schneckloth, 4 1 2  U.S. at 226). When person provides her name after being arrested for refusing to 
state her name, she is acquiescing the State's demand because the State has demonstrated an inten­
tion to sanction her if she does not acquiesce. 
1 86. This would include any information linked to the person's database profile as a result of 
the police encounter, such as the time and place of the encounter. 
1 87. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (discussing the exclusion of involuntarily obtained con­
fessions). 
1 88. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 ( 1984) (holding that evidence derived 
from a "poisonous tree" may be admitted if there is also an independent source for the information); 
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provided after she was arrested is introduced into evidence at trial or used in 
the development of the independent case, then there is not a violation of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause. 
Finally, recognition of the right to invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination when an individual confronts an officer requesting her name 
does not imply the extension of Miranda rights189 to this situation. The po­
lice are only required to give a Miranda warning prior to a custodial 
interrogation. 190 Typically the request for an individual's name is made prior 
to the initiation of a custodial interrogation. Recognizing the right not to 
state one's name does not suggest that a Miranda warning must be given 
prior to any police questioning. 
C. Permitting a Person to Refuse to State Her Name Would 
Not Unduly lnteifere with Law Enforcement 
Some might suggest that either officer safety or public safety justifies 
requiring a person to provide her name to a police officer in a non-traffic­
stop, pre-arrest situation because the name will enable the officer to ascer­
tain if the person has any outstanding warrants or prior convictions. 191 A 
Terry pat-down, however, should provide an officer with sufficient ability to 
protect herself. 192 A public safety exception to the right of a person to refuse 
to state her name would undermine the functionality of the rule. First, a pub­
lic safety exception would impair the ability of an individual to determine 
when the Self-Incrimination Clause j ustifies refusing to state her name. Sec­
ond, a public safety exception would provide a means for the police to 
circumvent the protection that the Self-Incrimination Clause provides to a 
person with regard to stating her name. 193 A rule that allowed the public 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 25 1 U.S. 385, 392 ( 1920) ("The essence of a provision 
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall 
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the 
facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an inde­
pendent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's 
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."). 
1 89. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1 966). 
190. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 29 1 ,  300 ( 1980). 
1 9 1 .  E.g., NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 32, 2004 WL 1 2 1 586, at *4-6. 
1 92. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 1 77, 1 96 n.7 (2004) (Stevens, J., dis­
senting) ("The Court suggests that furnishing identification also allows the investigating officer to 
assess the threat to himself and others. But to the extent that officer or public safety is immediately 
at issue, that concern is sufficiently alleviated by the officer's ability to perform a limited patdown 
search for weapons.") (citation omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ,  28 ( 1 968) ("We cannot say his 
decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or 
inventive imagination . . .  the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of 
an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible 
danger, and took limited steps to do so."). 
1 93. See supra Section Il.B. l .  
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safety exception to be invoked only when genuinely justified by a safety 
interest would be difficult to administer. 194 
A broader argument might be made that the interest of public or officer 
safety demands that a person may never invoke the Self-Incrimination 
Clause to refuse to state her name in a non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation. 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that concerns about public safety, 
even immediate concerns, have only limited persuasive authority to justify 
disregarding a constitutionally protected right. 195 The seriousness of the 
safety concern presented by an individual being permitted to refuse to state 
her name is undermined by the large number of states that do not have stat­
utes requiring an individual to state her name. 196 Additionally, the 
permissibility of a Terry pat-down provides police officers with a means to 
ensure that a person does not have any dangerous weapons. 197 As to the con­
cerns about public safety, interpreting the Self-Incrimination Clause to 
justify refusing to state one's name has relatively minimal public safety im­
plications as compared to prior Supreme Court decisions that exclude 
confessions. 198 Specifically, in excluding confessions because of the failure 
to give Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amend­
ment to protect a person for whom the probability of guilt is relatively high. 
In contrast, when a person refuses to state her name, there is no direct evi­
dence, like a confession, to support the belief that she is a criminal. 
Moreover, for the individuals that pose the greatest threat to either officer 
safety or public safety, there is reason to believe that these individuals would 
not provide their actual names to the police. 199 A false name negates the 
value of a database search to the police officer. 
The interests in favor of requiring a person to always state her name in a 
non-traffic-stop, pre-arrest situation do not warrant disregarding the impor­
tance of the individual right embodied in the Self-Incrimination Clause. In 
194. The problem arises because the police officer already has a reasonable suspicion that the 
person is involved in criminal activity in order to justify the Terry stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. In this 
context, it is not clear what standard would enable courts to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate exercises of a public safety exception. 
1 95. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272-74 (2000) (rejecting the contention that concerns 
about public safety should justify a stop-and-frisk on less than reasonable suspicion). 
1 96. See supra notes 1 45, 1 46, & 1 48 (citing the stop-and-identify statutes of eighteen states 
that have such statutes). 
1 97. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 1 96 n.7 (Stevens, J.,  dissenting); J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 ("Firearms are 
dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recog­
nize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry's rule, which permits 
protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that officers 
meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very concern."). 
1 98. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432, 444 (2000) (holding inadmissible 
the confession of an individual charged with bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and 
using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence because the defendant had not re­
ceived his Miranda warnings prior to confessing). 
1 99. A person who is willing to attack a police officer during the course of an investigation or 
a person who previously committed a serious crime presumably has a relatively low level of respect 
for the law. The lack of respect for the law would suggest that such a person would be unconcerned 
about the illegality of providing a false name to a police officer. 
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interpreting the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Supreme Court has "created 
prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right pro­
tected by the Self-Incrimination Clause,"200 and these protections "sweep[] 
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."20 1  Moreover, permitting a 
person to refuse to state her name is deeply tied to society's valuation of 
anonymity.202 The social value of anonymity is closely tied to the social 
value of the right not to speak.203 In analyzing anonymous pamphleteering, 
the Supreme Court has said: 
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, 
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies 
the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in par­
ticular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas 
from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society. 204 
This suggests that the values embodied in the decision to permit a per­
son not to state her name are closely tied to the American conception of 
205 democracy. 
D. Technological Change and the Application 
of Constitutional Rights 
Like other constitutional protections, the Fifth Amendment's Self­
Incrimination Clause should be adapted in consideration of technological 
change. The challenges of applying the Fifth Amendment's Self­
Incrimination Clause in consideration of advances in computer database 
technology are similar to the challenges the Supreme Court confronted in 
200. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
20 1 .  Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 ( 1 985)). For other cases in which the 
Supreme Court explains the breadth of its construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, see Maness 
v. Meyers, 4 1 9  U.S. 449, 461 ( 1975), Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 7 1 ,  72-73 ( 1920), and Coun­
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 ( 1 892). 
202. See generally Loewy, supra note 1 1 , at 929-30 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Hiibel 
failed to appreciate the significance of the value of anonymity in American constitutional history 
and culture). 
203. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 7 1 4  ( 1 977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought 
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, politi­
cal, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such 
concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components 
of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' " (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9  
U.S. 624, 637 ( 1 943))); Estrada, supra note 94, at 309. 
204. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 5 1 4  U.S. 334, 357 ( 1 995) (citation omitted). 
205. See generally, ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY ( 1 955) (providing 
the transcripts of three speeches explaining the history and role of the Fifth Amendment's Self­
Incrimination Clause in American society). The Supreme Court has referenced The Fifth Amend­
ment Today in several cases. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 794 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,  
concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 n.8 (2000); 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 n.4 ( 1 964); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 
426 n. l ( 1 956). 
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applying the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause to thermal 
imaging technology in Kyllo v. United States .206 The Court in Kyllo sought to 
prevent technological advancement from eroding a constitutionally pro­
tected right.207 The Court stated that using the thermal imaging technology to 
obtain "information regarding the interior of the home that could not other­
wise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,' constitutes a search . . . . This assures preservation of that 
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amend-
d d ,,208 ment was a opte . 
Applying the Self-Incrimination Clause to a person who refuse to state 
her name because of the information that is made easily accessible by com­
puter databases serves to adapt existing protections in light of technological 
change. At the time of the Founding, the ability to use a person's name to 
link and track that person on the scale made possible by computer databases 
did not exist. In the absence of computer databases, a name primarily pro­
vides a means of referencing a person and later contacting that individual. 
Advances in database search technology have altered the implications of 
requiring a person to state her name to law enforcement officers. If the Self­
Incrimination Clause is to retain its meaning in consideration of these impli­
cations, then individuals must be allowed to refuse to state their names. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to a person 
responding to a police officer's request to state her name represents a com­
plex proposition. Delimiting the boundaries of the proper invocation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination necessitates an appreciation of the im­
plications of stating one's name. This Note suggests that a requirement that 
a person state her name in a context where that name facilitates a search of 
various databases fulfills the three requirements for invoking the privilege 
against self-incrimination-that the statement be testimonial , incriminating, 
and compelled. Many individuals would be legally justified in invoking the 
privilege as a basis for refusing to state their names. Providing full meaning 
206. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001 ). The distinction between detecting lawful 
versus unlawful activity recognized in Illinois v. Caballes, 1 25 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005), did not abro­
gate this proposition. 
207. Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 34 ("While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas 
such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences is 
at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of homes-the prototypical and hence most com­
monly l itigated area of protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common 
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To 
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the 
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technol­
ogy any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." 
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 5 1 2  ( 1 96 1 ))). 
208. Id. (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 5 1 2) (emphasis added). 
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to the rights of those who would be legally justified in refusing to state a 
name requires that anyone be permitted to refuse to state her name. Recog­
nizing the permissibility of such an invocation creates difficulties for courts 
in handling situations where such an invocation was made. This Note dem­
onstrates that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause requires the 
elimination of criminal sanctions for those who decline to state their names 
based on the privilege against self-incrimination. Additional questions re­
main as to how courts can best protect an individual's right under the Fifth 
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause when she is compelled to state her 
name after first invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Neverthe­
less, recognizing the right to invoke the privilege would represent a 
substantial step toward securing the principles embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE O F  REFERENCED DATABASES 
Name of the Database Agency or Responsible Information Available 
Companies through the Database 
FACTS/MATRIX'09 MATRIX"3 MATRIX'" 
Factual Analysis Criminal • U.S. Department of • Criminal history information 
Threat Solution-FACTS"0 Homeland Security- • State sexual offender lists 
Office for Domestic • Property ownership 
Multi-State Anti· Terrorism Preparedness • Uniform Commercial Code 
Information Exchange- • U.S. Department of filings 
MATRIX'" Justice-Office of Justice • Bankruptcy filings 
Programs • FAA pilot licenses and 
FACTS is the database • Connecticut aircraft ownership records 
search technology that was • Florida • Coast Guard registered 
developed by the MATRIX • Michigan'" vessels 
project."' • Ohio • State-issued professional 
• Pennsylvania licenses 
• Driver's license information 
FACTS'" and photo images 
• LexisNexis • Motor vehicle registration 
• Florida information 
• Ohio 
209. The MATRIX was a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and 
several states. The MATRIX was a pilot program designed to develop means of coordinating infor­
mation among various federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. The FACTS system was 
developed by the MATRIX Pilot Project and is a resource that remains available to law enforcement 
despite the termination of the MATRIX Pilot Project on April 1 5, 2005. See generally KROUSE, 
supra note 32; Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, supra note 27. 
2 1 0. 
2 1 1 .  
2 1 2. 
27, at I. 
Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, supra note 27, at 1 .  
KROUSE, supra note 32, at 1 .  
KROUSE, supra note 32, at 4; Press Release, Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, supra note 
2 1 3. KROUSE, supra note 32, at 3-4 (listing participants). 
2 1 4. Michigan withdrew from the MATRIX Pilot Project in March of 2005. Michigan State 
Police Quit Anti-Terrorism Database, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 3504465. Additionally, Alabama, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin withdrew from the project after having initially 
decided to participate. KROUSE, supra note 32, at 4-5. 
2 1 5 . See Police Data Sharing Is a Work in Progress, ThCHWEBNEws, Apr. 25, 2005, available 
at 2005 WLNR 6459808 (explaining that only Ohio and Florida have entered into contracts with 
LexisNexis, which owns the FACTS technology). 
2 1 6. KROUSE, supra note 32, at 6. 
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Name of the Database Agency or Responsible 
Companies 
National Crime Information • U.S. Department of 
Center-NCIC211 Justice 
• Federal Bureau of 
Investigation-Criminal 
Justice Information 
Services Division"8 
Transportation Workers U.S. Department of 
Identification Credential- Homeland Security-
TWIC220 Transportation Security 
Administration'" 
2 1 7. DOJ Notice, supra note 28, at 52,343. 
2 1 8. Id. 
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Information Available 
through the Database 
Categories of Individuals 
Covered:219 
• Wanted persons 
• Individuals who have been 
charged with a serious 
offense 
• Missing persons 
• Individuals designated by 
the Secret Service as 
posing a potential danger to 
the president 
• Members of violent criminal 
gangs 
• Members of terrorist 
organizations 
• Unidentified persons (e.g., 
unidentified deceased 
person) 
For individuals authorized for 
unescorted entry to secure 
transportation areas:"' 
• Individual's name 
• Address 
• Phone number 
• Social security number 
• Date of birth 
• Place of birth 
• Administrative identification 
codes/Unique card serial 
number 
• Systems identification codes 
• Company, organization, or 
affiliation 
• Issue date of authorization 
for access 
• Expiration date of 
authorization for access 
• Biometric data and digital 
photograph 
• Access level information 
2 1 9. Id. at 52,343-44 (listing the categories in addition to providing definitions for the catego-
ries and listing subcategories). 
220. TSA Notice, supra note 30, at 49,507--08. 
22 1 .  Id. at 49,507. 
222. Id. at 49,508. 
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Name of the Database Agency or Responsible Information Available 
Companies through the Database 
United States-Visitor and Department of Homeland Immigration information 
Immigrant Status Indicator Security 224 including:'" 
Technology-US· VISIT"' • Biometric identifiers 
(photograph, fingerprint) 
• Copies of travel documents 
• Name 
• Date of birth 
• Citizenship 
• Sex 
• Passport number 
• Country of issuance 
• Alien registration number 
• Address 
223. Notice of Revised US-VISIT PIA, supra note 29; Notice of US-VISIT PIA, supra note 
29. 
224. Notice of Revised US-VISIT PIA, supra note 29, at 57,038. 
225. Id. at 57,044. 
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